Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Is It Time to Invade Burma? (Is It Time to Invade Georgia?)
The first part of this post's title is also the title of a new article at Time.com. (Note: on CNN.com, they title the article "Time to Invade Myanmar?")

And so begins the latest iteration of the humanitarian intervention debate. After a recap of the situation in Myanmar, the article notes:
...it's hard to imagine a regime this insular and paranoid accepting robust aid from the US military, let alone agreeing to the presence of US Marines on Burmese soil — as Thailand and Indonesia did after the tsunami. The trouble is that the Burmese haven't shown the ability or willingness to deploy the kind of assets needed to deal with a calamity of this scale — and the longer Burma resists offers of help, the more likely it is that the disaster will devolve beyond anyone's control. "We're in 2008, not 1908," says Jan Egeland, the former U.N. emergency relief coordinator. "A lot is at stake here. If we let them get away with murder we may set a very dangerous precedent."

That's why it's time to consider a more serious option: invading Burma. Some observers, including former USAID director Andrew Natsios, have called on the US to unilaterally begin air drops to the Burmese people regardless of what the junta says. The Bush Administration has so far rejected the idea — "I can't imagine us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday — but it's not without precedent: as Natsios pointed out to the Wall Street Journal, the US has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the host government's consent in places like Bosnia and Sudan.
The article concludes that, if current attempts at assistance fail,
"It's important for the rulers to know the world has other options," [Jan Egeland, a former UN emergency reloief coordinator] says. "If there were, say, the threat of a cholera epidemic that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and the government was incapable of preventing it, then maybe yes — you would intervene unilaterally." But by then, it could be too late. The cold truth is that states rarely undertake military action unless their national interests are at stake; and the world has yet to reach a consensus about when, and under what circumstances, coercive interventions in the name of averting humanitarian disasters are permissible. As the response to the 2004 tsunami proved, the world's capacity for mercy is limitless. But we still haven't figured out when to give war a chance.
I am of two minds when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Cases such as Myanmar may be the less difficult cases--situations where there is a threat of widepread disease or famine (let alone the physical injuries and other forms of suffering caused by the storm) and a government is either incapable or uninterested in actually doing what needs to happen to save its own citizens. I'm not saying that that is an easy case for humanitarian intervention, just that it is not as hard as other examples that are more politically ambiguous, such as intervening because of civil strife or sectarian violence.

Turning such a political decision into a legal rule is fraught with dangers. What do we do if the Russian intervene militarily in Georgia, on the pretext that they are protecting Russian passport holders? What of Turkey's intervention in Northern Cyprus in the 1970's on the argument that it was protecting Turkish Cypriots from violence? As I've written regarding Kosovo, the law of unintended consequences is a mighty force to reckon with.

The people of Myanmar desperately need help and they need it now. Perhaps intervening without the consent of their government will be the necessary and moral thing to do. I don't know enough about the facts on the ground to judge that. But, even if various states do undertake such an action, they should think very carefully about proclaiming the existence of a legal principle favoring humanitarian intervention.




Thursday, May 8, 2008

How Do You Interpret the Last-in-Time Rule?
Boring tax case, interesting international law issue. That's how I would summarize Jamieson v. CIR. The issue in Jamieson is what happens if a treaty says one thing, a subsequent statute conflicts with that treaty, and then there is a subsequent treaty change to the conflicting treaty provision, but that amendment does not remove the conflict. Under the last-in-time rule which provision prevails? Here is what the U.S. Tax Court ruled:


In 1986, while the U.S.-Canada Convention was in force, Congress amended the AMT imposed on noncorporate taxpayers by section 55 and added section 59 to the Code.... [Thereafter] the U.S.-Canada Convention was amended.... The revised Protocol Amending the Convention... made changes to Article XXIV affecting credits for Social Security tax, corporate tax exemptions, and the tax treatment of dividends, interest, and royalties,... but did not alter the general rule found in article XXIV, paragraph 1. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol references section 59 [the earlier conflicting statutory provision].

It is well established that, where a statute and a treaty pertain to the same subject matter, they must be read so as to give effect to both if at all possible.... If, however, the statute and the treaty conflict, the last-in-time rule requires that “the last expression of the sovereign will ... [controls].”...

Applying the last-in-time rule, we hold that section 59(a)(2) is the last expression of the sovereign will and that it takes precedence over the U.S.-Canada Convention to the extent there is a conflict between them. [The statute] makes it very clear that Congress intended the limitation of section 59(a)(2) to supersede existing treaty provisions prohibiting double taxation. The U.S.-Canada Convention was one of those treaties. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol contains any provision clearly indicating that Congress's intention to ensure that taxpayers with sufficient means should contribute a minimum amount of tax to the United States had been superseded.

So a treaty provision conflicts with a statute, and then that treaty provision is amended without fixing the conflict. Under the last-in-time rule, although the amended treaty provision came later, the failure to address the conflict means that the earlier conflicting statute controls? That logic seems more than a little curious to me. I wonder what others think.

Tuesday, May 6, 2008

How Do You Chip out of a Mortar Hole?
I'm sorry, I just can't let this one go:
Picture, if you will, a tree-lined plaza in Baghdad's International Village, flanked by fashion boutiques, swanky cafes, and shiny glass office towers. Nearby a golf course nestles agreeably, where a chip over the water to the final green is but a prelude to cocktails in the club house and a soothing massage in a luxury hotel, which would not look out of place in Sydney harbour. Then, as twilight falls, a pre-prandial stroll, perhaps, amid the cool of the Tigris Riverfront Park, where the peace is broken only by the soulful cries of egrets fishing.

Improbable though it all may seem, this is how some imaginative types in the US military are envisaging the future of Baghdad's Green Zone, the much-pummelled redoubt of the Iraqi capital where a bunker shot has until now had very different connotations.

A $5bn (£2.5bn) tourism and development scheme for the Green Zone being hatched by the Pentagon and an international investment consortium would give the heavily fortified area on the banks of the Tigris a "dream" makeover that will become a magnet for Iraqis, tourists, business people and investors. About half of the area is now occupied by coalition forces, the US state department or private foreign companies.

The US military released the first tentative artists' impression yesterday. An army source said the barbed wire, concrete blast barriers and checkpoints that currently disfigure the 5 sq mile area would be replaced by shopping malls, hotels, elegant apartment blocks and leisure parks. "This is at the end of the day an Iraqi-owned area and we will give it back to them with added value," said the source, who requested anonymity.

Potential investors are being encouraged to take a punt that years ahead, Baghdad's fortunes may mirror former war-torn cities such as Sarajevo and Beirut that have risen from the ashes.

Marriott International has already signed a deal to build a hotel in the Green Zone, according to Navy Captain Thomas Karnowski, the chief US liaison. Also in the pipeline is a possible $1bn investment from MBI International, a hotel and resorts specialist led by Saudi sheikh, Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber.

One Los Angeles-based firm, C3, has said it wants to build an amusement park on the Green Zone's outskirts. As part of the first phase, a skateboard park is due to open this summer.
The best thing about the "artist's rendering" is the complete absence of background. Wonder why that is?

Friday, May 2, 2008

The Role of Precedent at the WTO
Earlier this week the WTO Appellate Body clarified the role of legal precedent in WTO jurisprudence. The background to the discussion was a WTO panel’s refusal to follow a previous Appellate Body decision because the panel viewed the previous Appellate Body decision as failing to accord proper deference to permissible Member State interpretations. The details of the panel decision are here. I have written about judicial overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body and basically agreed with the lower panel’s legal reasoning on deference to permissible interpretations of Member States in the AD/CVD context.

Well, the Appellate Body in Stainless Steel (Mexico) did not take kindly to the panel’s refusal to follow the previous Appellate Body report and issued the following smack down:

158. It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been adopted by the DSB….

160. Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members attach significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system. Ensuring "security and predictability" in the dispute settlement system … implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.

161. In the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body have distinct roles to play…. The Panel's failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Members' rights and obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated under the DSU….

162. We are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel's approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system ….

Did you catch all of that? WTO Appellate Body decisions are not binding, but they must be followed. Unless, that is, there are cogent reasons not to follow them. But then if you don’t follow them because you think you do have cogent reasons (i.e., the standard of review in the treaty was ignored by the previous Appellate Body report), then the Appellate Body will be deeply concerned.

The role of precedent has always been difficult with respect to international courts and tribunals. But I read the Appellate Body in Stainless Steel (Mexico) as essentially requiring panels to follow Appellate Body decisions and treat them as legal precedent. You can't call it legal precedent, but it is. As one anonymous commenter put it in this post, the message from the Appellate Body to panels is the following:


You really, really should follow prior Appellate Body decisions. It would be quite bad for the system if you do not. But if you've got what you think are compelling reasons for not doing so, we understand if you feel you have to go your own way. Bearing in mind, of course, that if you do, we will almost certainly reverse you on appeal. You may think your reasons are pretty good, but if they were really that persuasive we would have gone that way ourselves, hence they are not, in fact, "cogent".

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

The Law Firm of 2025: Richer, Larger, More Global
The American Lawyer has just published a great article on the future of law firms. The bottom line: successful law firms will be global operations with thousands of lawyers led by an elite group of partners with staggering profits-per-partner. Here is an excerpt:


The projections make it clear that U.S. corporate law firms of the future will be wealthier, larger, and more international than they were in the past…. Six firms … will gross more than $10 billion: Kirkland & Ellis; Mayer Brown; Baker & McKenzie; Jones Day; Skadden; and Latham. By 2025 Latham, at $23 billion, will have dramatically outpaced Skadden, its nearest competitor at $15.9 billion.

The PPP [profits-per-partner] projections for 2025 have Wachtell partners bringing home almost $15.7 million (before adjusting for inflation). Cravath, Swaine & Moore's PPP will be $9.6 million; Skadden's $6 million; and Baker & McKenzie's $2.5 million. The highest 2025 projected profits per partner are at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, where the model suggests partners will net nearly $20 million apiece in 2025….

White & Case is projected to be the biggest of the 47 firms in the analysis, with 13,824 lawyers; Baker & McKenzie will follow closely behind with 13,512. More than three-quarters of the lawyers at both firms will be based outside the United States. Jones Day will have 11,623 lawyers and Latham 11,066, of whom almost 40 percent will be international….

And as the roster of firms atop the PPP and RPL projections indicates, the gap between firms will grow ever larger. The rich will continue to get richer and the poor relatively poorer…. Big firms will become bigger relative to smaller firms; and firms with a strong international presence will stand in greater contrast to those firms that have a minimal or no international presence.

These projections present numerous challenges and opportunities for firms in The Am Law 200. For firms to maintain the growth rates they established in the last 20 years-the rates that resulted in these optimistic predictions-they will have to grapple with a number of critical questions:

Will the market for high-end corporate legal services continue to expand? The projections assume that demand will continue to grow at historic rates. For that to happen, however, law firms will have to penetrate or create new markets, whether in other countries or new practice areas. …

How will the firms of the future manage the complexities of their ever-increasing size and geographical scope? The firm of the past had a few hundred lawyers. Several firms today have more than 1,000-but in 20 years, a 1,000-lawyer firm will be midsize. And firms will be much more geographically dispersed. Managing complexity will require that firm leaders continually develop and market their firm's expertise, while at the same time nurturing talent.

What will be the organizational identity of firms with an increasing percentage of lawyers outside the U.S.? A number of firms will cross the threshold and become global operations, no longer just U.S. firms with an international presence. Will such firms suffer identity crises? Will they be able to create a global identity that unites their partners worldwide?

Will firms that have avoided international expansion be able to continue to grow? Projections suggest that in 2025 Wachtell will still be wholly domestic and Cravath will have only about 6 percent of its lawyers outside the U.S. If the market forces them to move to a more global model, they may suffer significant financial and cultural costs, especially if they have to move quickly. Domestic firms with less marketable reputations may be hurt even more if they have to play global catch-up….

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

When Does Application of the Warsaw Convention End and State Tort Law Begin?
Last week a Florida state court rendered an interesting decision on the scope of application of the Warsaw Convention. The court recognized that state tort law is preempted by the Warsaw Convention, but the critical question in Bowe v. Worldwide Flight Services was at what point in exiting a plane does the application of the treaty end and state tort law begin.


The plaintiffs in this case allege they were injured as a result of an accident that occurred on an up escalator as they exited an area the parties describe as a “bus depot,” located one level below Main Concourse E at the airport, when Mrs. Ferguson, Mrs. Deleveaux's eighty-eight-year-old mother, apparently fell backward onto both Ms. Bowe and Mrs. Deleveaux, resulting in all three suffering personal injuries. The complaint alleges the defendants were negligent by failing to fulfill a request for wheelchair assistance made for Mrs. Ferguson, which caused the plaintiffs to fend for themselves and hence, the escalator accident.

The record reflects the accident in this case occurred on July 29, 2001. Ms. Bowe, Mrs. Deleveaux, and Mrs. Ferguson had just arrived in Miami on an American Eagle commuter aircraft from Nassau. The aircraft arrived at a freestanding building, separate from the main concourse. In accordance with practice for aircraft arriving at that location, Ms. Bowe, Mrs. Deleveaux, and Mrs. Ferguson departed the aircraft and boarded an American Airlines bus for the short trip to the main terminal. The bus brought them to the bus depot. Although it appears from the record the bus depot is served by two escalators and an elevator, at best the record is murky concerning ingress, egress, and the extent to which the general passenger populace on the concourses is free to enter the depot area….

The preemptive effect of the Convention on local law extends no further than the Convention's own substantive scope. In this regard, it is clear from the text of the Convention it applies only to a “carrier.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17. In addition, the Convention applies only to injuries occurring either on board an aircraft or “in the course of any operations of embarking or disembarking.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17. These requirements constitute the initial inquiries we must make to determine whether the Convention is applicable to the claims being made and those we must consider here….

The Warsaw Convention also does not define or elucidate upon the phrase “operations of embarking or disembarking.” See Warsaw Convention, art. 17. However, it is clear the term does not automatically exclude events transpiring, as is the case here, within an airline terminal building. Rather than impose location-based or other rigid criteria to delimit these periods of liability under the Warsaw Convention, courts employ a three-prong test or guide to determine whether a passenger is entitled to seek the benefits of the Convention by considering: (1) the passenger's activity at the time of the accident; (2) the passenger's whereabouts at the time of the accident; and (3) the amount of control being exercised by the carrier at the time of the injury. In addition, when considering these factors, these same courts have made clear that no single factor is dispositive. Instead, “the three factors form a ‘single, unitary [analytical] base.'"

That three-part test poses difficult questions as to when the application of the treaty ends and state law begins. Depending on what the passenger is doing, where they are doing it, and whether they are “controlled” by the carrier, the Warsaw Convention applies. The key idea is that there is a point in every flight of every passenger that he or she ceases to “disembark” from flight. At that exact moment state tort law applies. But before that moment, the Warsaw Convention applies and preempts contrary state law. So where should that line be? At the airplane door, the terminal gate, the baggage carousel, or perhaps the airport parking lot?

Incidentally, the court in Bowe makes no mention of Medellin and whether the Warsaw Convention should still be interpreted as a self-executing treaty in light of Medellin. Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing, but the preemption analysis in the Supreme Court’s decision in El Al Israel v. Tseng offers a useful comparison to the self-executing analysis in Medellin. In El Al Israel, the Court ruled that a “home-centered preemption analysis … should not be applied, mechanically, in construing our international obligations” and that the “text, drafting history, and underlying purpose of the Convention” should be examined to determine whether a treaty preempts state law. The Court also looked extensively to the interpretations given to the treaty in the “opinions of sister signatories.” Medellin, by contrast, focused primarily on text and the interpretion of the United States, which it said is entitled to great weight. As we try to make sense of Medellin, it would be useful to analyze why the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing in El Al Israel, but that in Medellin it ruled that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter is not.


Monday, April 14, 2008

Free Speech at the Olympics
Free speech at the Beijing Olympics is becoming a hot topic. IOC President Jacques Rogge held a press conference last week taking a firm line restricting all political speech anywhere at an Olympic site.


Rule 51.3 of the Olympic Charter provides that “no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or areas," a principle that has been in the Olympic Charter for more than 50 years in order to preserve the universality of the Games. "The application of this regulation is common sense," explained Rogge, adding that without this rule, Olympic competitions and ceremonies could be used as a stage for all different kinds of political statements about armed conflicts, regional differences of all kind, religious disputes and many others.

"If athletes genuinely want to express their opinion, that's fine," Rogge continued. "But let's not forget, there is also the right not to express an opinion. Athletes should feel no moral obligation to speak out. They deserve the right to focus on their preparations and should not be made to feel obliged to express themselves if they do not wish to. The IOC and the National Olympic Committees have the duty to protect them from any kind of pressure. In any case, I do not expect there will be many incidents (of breach of rule 51). Athletes are mature and intelligent people. They will know what they can say or not say. If they have doubts, the IOC and the NOCs are here to guide them."

I have mixed feelings about this issue. I would strongly oppose any boycott of the Olympic games, but I am troubled by the prospect of a prior restraint on political speech at any Olympic venue or site. What qualifies as a “demonstration” or “political propaganda”? Can an athlete walk around the Olympic village with a yellow ribbon attached to his shirt to symbolize his support for a Free Tibet? Can athletes discuss with reporters (or publish blog posts from their Olympic village apartments) about anything political, such as China’s human rights record, the great firewall of China, Darfur, or its lax intellectual property record? And if free speech is restricted in the Olympic areas, will there be free speech zones somewhere at or near the Olympics, as was the case at the 2002 Olympics in Utah?

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Supreme Court Averts War Between Delaware and New Jersey
Okay maybe not war exactly. But last month the Supreme Court rendered an interesting opinion resolving a bitter border dispute between Delaware and New Jersey. Just how bitter? Well, according to the Court, the dispute became so heated that “Delaware considered authorizing the National Guard to protect its border from encroachment [and] one New Jersey legislator looked into recommissioning the museum-piece battleship U.S.S. New Jersey in the event that the vessel might be needed to repel an armed invasion by Delaware.” Armed invasion of the Jersey shore by the Delaware National Guard?

What could have led these two states to almost come to blows? Of course, oil. Well, okay not oil exactly, but natural gas. In essence, New Jersey wanted to construct a natural gas facility in New Jersey and build a pier that extended into Delaware waters for supertankers to dock. Delaware refused to authorize this, which led New Jersey to conclude that Delaware was acting beyond the scope of its regulatory authority.

Why would Delaware not have the authority to regulate the construction of a pier within its own territory? Ordinarily it would, of course, but a 1905 Compact between the states gave New Jersey the right to build such a pier without Delaware’s approval. Or so New Jersey argued.

New Jersey read the Compact to give New Jersey “exclusive regulatory authority over all projects appurtenant to its shores, including wharves extending past the low-water mark on New Jersey's side into Delaware territory.” The Court disagreed. I won’t bore you with the details, but suffice it to say that the Court interpreted the 1905 Compact to conclude that both states had concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

So Delaware won the day and the great New Jersey War was averted. Thank goodness, otherwise the next Supreme Court case between Delaware and New Jersey would be over the interpretation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, … engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”


Tuesday, April 1, 2008

Hall Street and its Impact on International Arbitration
Amidst all the focus on last week's decision in Medellin, most readers missed another important decision rendered by the Supreme Court that will have a significant impact on international law. The case of Hall Street v. Mattel concerns the ability of contractual parties to fashion judicial review of domestic and international arbitration awards.

As a general rule, the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes federal courts to confirm, vacate, or modify awards. Confirmation transforms an arbitral award into a court judgment that is fully enforcable like any other court judgment. Vacating an award renders it unenforceable in the United States, but that option is only available on very narrow grounds of significant procedural irregularity outlined in Section 10 of the FAA. Modification of an arbitral award is only appropriate for simple and inadvertent problems like clerical or computational errors.

The question raised in Hall Street is whether contractual parties could draft into the contract a fourth path, namely judicial review of an award for legal or factual error. Such review is not among the expressly enumerated powers of the courts under the FAA, and before Hall Street there had been a circuit-split as to the propriety of such review. The Court rejected Hall Street's argument and held that the only options available to courts are those outlined in the FAA: confirmation, vacatur, and modification.

The case is important for two reasons. First, the Court quite explicitly rejected the notion that parties could craft a mechanism for judicial review of factual or legal error. One of the major concerns about arbitration is that there is no appeal mechanism where arbitrators get it wrong and many speculated that without the possibility of judicial review parties will forego arbitration.

The second reason Hall Street is important is that the Court rejected a judicially-crafted exception that circuit courts had developed known as "manifest disregard of the law." Essentially, courts had added a non-statutory ground for vacatur if it could be established that the arbitrator knew the law and deliberately ignored it. It's not exactly review for legal error, but it is close. But again, the Court interpreted Section 10 as exhausting the available grounds for vacating an arbitral award. Here is an excerpt:


Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see [the relevant provisions of the FAA] as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process,” and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process....

When all these arguments based on prior legal authority are done with, Hall Street and Mattel remain at odds over what happens next. Hall Street and its amici say parties will flee from arbitration if expanded review is not open to them. One of Mattel's amici foresees flight from the courts if it is. We do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say whether the exclusivity reading of the statute is more of a threat to the popularity of arbitrators or to that of courts. But whatever the consequences of our holding, the statutory text gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds.


How will the decision impact international arbitration? At the international level I doubt it will discourage parties to avoid arbitration, because distrust of national courts is a principal reason for opting to use a neutral arbitral forum in the first place. It also will stregthen the power of arbitral panels by limiting the grounds for vacating awards. "Manifest disregard of the law" had become a kitchen-sink argument thrown in to many vacatur proceedings as a back-door attempt to secure a merits review. It may also create incentives for the development of internal appeals processes within arbitral institutions, a subject about which Erin Gleason Alvarez, a former student of mine, has written an awarding-winning article.

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

The End of "Respectful Consideration" and the Birth of Disaggregated Deference
There is much one could say about Medellín, but I want to focus on the meta-question of what this decision portends for the future of international courts and tribunals. While the domestic effect of ICJ decisions is now cast into serious doubt (at least in terms of direct enforcement), I think there is far more reason to be hopeful than some are suggesting.

First, the Court emphasized that the effect to be given to international courts and tribunals depends first and foremost on whether there is a federal mandate to respect such decisions. It emphasized that such a federal mandate might be found in a self-executing treaty or a congressional statute. The Court said it agreed “as a general matter [that] an agreement to abide by the result of an international adjudication can be a treaty obligation,” but found that “the particular treaty obligations on which Medellín relies do not of their own force create domestic law.” (p. 24). The Court also agreed that a statute could have the same effect. “The judgments of a number of international tribunals enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation.” (p. 25).

Second, the Court fully embraced the principle that domestic effect should be given to decisions of international courts and tribunals if that is what federal law requires. As I have written elsewhere, this domestic effect falls along a continuum of deference. The Court cited with approval the “full faith and credit” approach of 22 U.S.C. 1650a, which treats ICSID decisions exactly the same as domestic court decisions. (p. 25). It also cited with approval an “arbitration model” under the New York Convention that accords great deference to international arbitral decisions pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. (p. 26). The decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal are the best example of an international tribunal that falls within this sort of approach. Although somewhat less clear, the Court also appears to accept a “foreign judgment” model, provided the international tribunal is rendering monetary awards (rather than injunctive relief) and provided the international decision does not contravene domestic law. (p. 26). Mass claims tribunals such as the UNCC are possible candidates for such a foreign judgment model. (It is also worth noting that the citation in footnote 1 to the La Abra case involving the U.S.-Mexico Claims Commission--one of the few Supreme Court decisions utilizing a foreign judgment model for an international tribunal decision--may suggest that if a foreign judgment model is to be employed, again the treaty (or implementing legislation) must mandate that approach.)

Third, the Court effectively relegated ICJ decisions to the same status as the decisions of the WTO Appellate Body. Direct recognition of WTO decisions is precluded by implementing federal legislation (19 U.S.C. 3512(c)). Under this implementing legislation, the political branches must decide what domestic effect to give to WTO decisions. Apparently the same now applies to ICJ decisions. ICJ decisions may be given domestic effect, but the mechanism is through the political branches. The President tried to do that, but failed in his choice of mechanism. Obviously if it so desired, Congress could achieve what the President’s Memorandum did not. That frequently happens with WTO decisions, with Congress amending the law to bring the United States into conformity with our international obligations as interpreted by WTO Appellate Body decisions.

Fourth, the Court did not address the issue of indirect recognition of decisions of international courts and tribunals. On this score nothing has changed. Charming Betsy remains vibrant and there is every reason to think that domestic courts in construing statutes will continue to rely on decisions of international courts and tribunals (including the ICJ) to interpret international law. The same goes for using international decisions as persuasive authority to understand the content of international law in matters such as ATS claims or boundary disputes.

We are witnessing the end of the era of “respectful consideration” and the birth of disaggregated deference. That is, the degree of deference domestic courts should accord to decisions of international courts depends on what federal law (i.e., self-executing treaties or implementing legislation) requires. That mandate may be more or less than "respectful consideration." In the absence of such a federal mandate, international tribunal decisions will not have direct effect, but they will continue to enjoy indirect recognition as tools of interpretation.

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Two Damage Awards, Two Different Bush Administration Positions
Has anyone else noticed the inconsistent -- and yes, somewhat hypocritical -- positions the Bush administration has taken toward damage awards US courts have imposed against Iraq and the Palestinian Authority? The administration is concerned that the $174 million award given to the family of a US citizen killed in Israel in 2002 will harm the Palestinian Authority's "political and financial viability," yet refuses to offer an opinion about whether a federal judge should nullify the award:
The decision in effect allows the State Department to sidestep a politically vexing issue concerning victims of terrorism, while retaining the option of intervening later if it appears that the cases could imperil the government headed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, officials said. In its filing to the court yesterday, the administration said it supports compensation for victims of terrorism, but urged a settlement of the lawsuits to the "mutual benefit" of all parties.

Lawmakers had urged State in recent weeks not to intervene, and the families of victims held emotional meetings with officials from the State and Justice departments two weeks ago. All sides claimed some measure of victory with the filing yesterday.

"I am glad that the government will not interfere at this stage and am hopeful that it will refrain from supporting the legal position of the terrorists-defendants in the future," said Leslye Knox, widow of Aharon Ellis, a U.S. citizen killed in Israel in 2002. A federal judge in 2006 ordered the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority to pay Knox and other Ellis relatives nearly $174 million, but nothing has been paid.
By contrast, the administration has actively opposed payment of the $1 billion in damages awarded to US soldiers who were tortured by Saddam's regime:
In a court challenge that the administration is winning so far but is not eager to publicize, administration lawyers have argued that Iraqi assets frozen in bank accounts in the United States are needed for Iraqi reconstruction and that the judgment won by the 17 former American prisoners should be overturned.

If the administration succeeds, the former prisoners would be deprived of the money they won and, they say, of the validation of a judge's ruling that documented their accounts of torture by the Iraqis — including beatings, burnings, starvation, mock executions and repeated threats of castration and dismemberment.

"I don't want to say that I feel betrayed, because I still believe in my country," said Lt. Col. Dale Storr, whose Air Force A-10 fighter jet was shot down by Iraqi fire in February 1991.

"I've always tried to keep in the back of my mind that we were never going to see any of the money," said Colonel Storr, who was held by the Iraqis for 33 days — a period in which he says his captors beat him with clubs, broke his nose, urinated on him and threatened to cut off his fingers if he did not disclose military secrets. "But it goes beyond frustration when I see our government trying to pretend that this whole case never happened."

Another former prisoner, David Eberly, a retired Air Force colonel whose F-15 fighter was shot down over northwest Iraq and who said his interrogators repeatedly pointed a gun at his head and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, said he was surprised by the administration's eagerness to overturn the judgment.

"The administration wants $87 billion for Iraq," he said. "The money in our case is just a drop of blood in the bucket."
I will leave it to our intrepid readers to discern the politics behind the different positions...

Sunday, March 9, 2008

Doomsday Seed Vault Opens
The so-called "doomsday" seed vault opened recently in Norway. It's a remarkable venture — and an even more remarkable piece of engineering:
"This is a frozen Garden of Eden," European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said at the opening ceremony Tuesday, as guests carried the first seed deposits into the icy vault, deep within an Arctic mountain in the remote Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard.

"It is the Noah's Ark for securing biological diversity for future generations," said Norway's Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg.

Svalbard Global Seed Vault, just 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from the North Pole, is designed to house as many as 4.5 million crop seeds from all over the world. It is built to withstand global warning, earthquakes and even nuclear strikes.

It will serve as a backup for the other 1,400 seed banks around the world, in case their deposits are hit by disasters, economic collapse, war or climate change.

For example, war wiped out seed banks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one in the Philippines was flooded in the wake of a typhoon in 2006.

"This is unique. This is very visionary. It is a precaution for the future," said 2004 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Wangari Maathai of Kenya. She is a board member of Crop Diversity Trust, which collects the seeds for the Svalbard vault.

The trust was founded by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and Biodiversity International, a Rome-based research group.

"It is very important for Africa to store seeds here because anything can happen to our national seed banks," Maathai said, bundled up against the cold.

Stoltenberg and Maathai made the first deposit in the vault — a box of rice seeds from 104 countries.

The seeds are packed in silvery foil containers — as many as 500 in each sample — and placed on blue and orange metal shelves inside three 10-by-27-meter (32-by-88-foot) storage chambers. Each vault can hold 1.5 million sample packages of all types of crop seeds, from carrots to wheat.
One hopes, of course, that the doomsday vault will never be needed, but it's still good to know it's there — and that the seeds within it can be stored safely for more than a millenium.

Thursday, March 6, 2008

Alien Slaves and Forum Non Conveniens
The Southern District of Florida last week rendered an interesting case involving alleged international trafficking of Cuban aliens to Curaçao where they were slave laborers. The case of Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co. focused on whether the case should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens.


Plaintiffs are three Cuban nationals who are now residents of Florida. The complaint alleges they suffered an arduous ordeal, as follows: The Defendant and the Cuban government trafficked the Plaintiffs from Cuba to Curaçao under threat of physical and psychological harm including the threat of imprisonment. Upon arrival in Curaçao, the Plaintiffs' passports were taken and they were held on the grounds of the Defendant, along with scores of their compatriots. The workers were only allowed to leave those grounds under the guard of Cuban government agents. They were forced to work in slave-like conditions for 112 hours per week performing drydock services on ships and oil platforms. The pay for their work, the complaint alleges, was paid to the Cuban government. (In discovery, Defendant admitted that it credited Cuba on a debt it was owed by Cuba in exchange for the labors of the Cuban workers). The complaint alleges a situation in which the government of Curaçao was likely complicit due to the circumstances in which the Plaintiffs were transported to Curaçao and held there. Further, the Plaintiffs were denied all protections of the laws of Curaçao for injuries they suffered there, and, when any of the workers were injured or complained, they were promptly deported to Cuba and treated as enemies of the state. If they escaped and were caught, they were likewise deported to Cuba and punished. Plaintiffs, however, successfully escaped the Defendant's drydock facility, and were hunted by Defendant and agents of the Defendant within Curaçao and by the agents of the Cuban government all the way to Colombia, where they were granted political asylum. The United States then granted Plaintiffs parole to enter the United States.

Plaintiffs' principal claims are that the Defendant and its government agents and co-conspirators violated the laws of nations by trafficking them from Cuba to Curaçao and by holding them and forcing them to work there. The main thrust of their action travels under the Alien Tort Statute…. In this case, Defendant has not met its burden to provide evidence that convinces the court that material injustice would result should this court exercise its jurisdiction in this matter. To the contrary, this Court determines that justice will best be served by its hearing this action in the Southern District of Florida….

Here … the only proposed alternative forum is one in which the Plaintiffs allege they only ever went to forcibly, and one in which they allege they never lived as free men. Courts have recognized that a forum where a plaintiff suffered trauma is inadequate. Here there is more than trauma. If the current facts did not make Curaçao inadequate, it certainly would be an undue prejudice or inconvenience to make these Plaintiffs go to the country they allege they were trafficked to, held in captivity, and face ongoing danger. A forum non conveniens dismissal in these circumstances would not pass the “ultimate inquiry” of serving not just the convenience of the parties, but also the “ends of justice”, and so is not warranted.

The private interest factors to be considered are the relative ease of access of proof, ability to obtain witnesses, and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. In this matter, Defendant is in Curaçao. However, Plaintiffs are all in Florida. The alleged injuries to Plaintiffs for forced labor occurred in Curaçao. On the other hand, the trafficking took place internationally and in Cuba, as well as in Curaçao….

Local interest in the controversy requires more examination. As stated before, the government of Curaçao has a general interest in regulating its corporations and enforcing its labor laws. This interest augurs towards it as a forum. However, Curaçao's more particularized interest in this case, stemming from any allegations that it was complicit in, acquiesced in, or failed to stop the alleged abuses of such a serious and explosive nature, is not seen by this Court as a local interest factor that militates towards Curaçao.

Further, any interest that a forum in Curaçao may have is countered by the public interest factors this jurisdiction has in the matter. This case concerns alleged violations of international human rights norms of concern to all nations and that the Alien Tort Statute empowered this Court to address. It concerns an alleged act of international trafficking. It concerns the human rights of people who have been Cuban citizens, an issue of concern to many members of this community. It concerns the foreign policy interests of the United States as expressed in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and the interests of Congress expressed in the RICO statute. All these public interest factors militate in favor of this Court's retention of this matter.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Can President Obama Withdraw the U.S. from NAFTA?
During the most recent U.S. presidential debate, candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton competed over who was against U.S. participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and who was REALLY against NAFTA. Interestingly, both candidates essentially pledged to, if elected, threaten to withdraw from NAFTA in order to force Canada and Mexico to renegotiate.

As a policy matter, this seems like a bad idea since the U.S. probably benefits more from NAFTA than either Mexico or Canada. But I recognize that many folks disagree, especially voters in Ohio. But the interesting legal question is how and whether a future President Obama (assuming he wins, as seems possible or even likely) would withdraw from NAFTA.

Under NAFTA itself, Article 2205 allows withdrawal "six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties." As a matter of international law then, there is no problem. But as a matter of U.S. domestic law, can a President withdraw on his own authority, or does he have to get Congressional approval?

It seems most likely that this is solely the President's call, since NAFTA is an executive agreement and not a treaty (and even if it was a treaty, the President probably can withdraw under his own authority). But it does seem odd that the President has such broad unilateral authority on a matter on which Congress has spoken with such excruciating detail. Will critics of executive power protest such unilateral executive action by President Obama?
Exxon v. Baker and the Sources of Federal Maritime Law
[John Paul Jones is Professor of Law at Richmond Law School and is an expert in maritime law.]

I’ve been invited to call your attention to the case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, for which a writ of certiorari went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Oral argument before the Supreme Court is scheduled for this morning. The case presents claims by Alaskan fishermen for loss of fishing opportunities and loss of value in their boats and licenses resulting from the oil spilled by the tank vessel Exxon Valdez when it grounded in Prince William Sound. The questions of law before the Court today are whether a ship’s owner may be vicariously liable to the extent of punitive damages for misconduct at sea by her master and whether omission from the Clean Water Act of any provision for punitive damages forecloses their award by resort to general maritime law on proof of misconduct of the sort covered in the Act.

Acting for several American law professors who pay particular attention to the maritime law of the United States and the admiralty practice of our federal courts, I submitted a brief amicus curiae urging that the Court issue the writ and resolve these questions because of their importance in admiralty cases. Our brief was intended to remind the Court of the special role created for federal courts by Article III, section 2 of the Constitution in the development through case decision of a body of substantive law for “cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”. It is generally conceded that when the Supreme Court abandoned in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) the position that there was a national or federal corpus of common law separate and distinct from that of each of the States, there remained intact a separate and distinct corpus of federal maritime law the product of case decisions, that is, the “general maritime law”. Thus, there is presented in any case within admiralty jurisdiction not just an occasion for a federal court to say what the law is, but also a duty to do so, and therefore an occasion as well for the Supreme Court to correct an inferior court on the matter. In our view, the decisions in this case by the District of Alaska and the Ninth Circuit, preoccupied with the evolving constitutional law of Due Process as a limit on punitive damages, had paid too little attention to antecedent questions about maritime law’s limits on punitive damages.

Our brief was also intended to remind the Court of the variety of sources to which the Court had resorted in the past when making American maritime law through case decision. In particular, citing Insurance Co. v. Dunham (1870) and Columbian Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Ashby and Stribling (1839), we reminded the Court of its enduring habit of recourse to the codes of the maritime nations of Europe and its reference as recently as 1994 in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde to a consensus among the world’s maritime nations. (In AmClyde, the Court recalled that it had found such support in 1975 for its decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer, Inc. to substitute comparative fault for division of damages by moieties in maritime cases, but admitted that none could be found on the question in AmClyde of how a non-settling tortfeasor should be credited for a settlement between the plaintiff and another joint tortfeasor. What mattered to us is that the Court again went looking for consensus abroad to buttress maritime law of the United States.)

We were also moved to remind the Court of its continuing interest in Restatements of the Law as sources for fresh maritime law and of the care the Court exhibits routinely for harmony in its work and that of the Congress.

After the writ was granted, we did not return to the Supreme Court with a second brief urging a particular resolution of either issue. Indeed, as we admitted in our brief in favor of the writ, we differ on how the issues of maritime law argued today should be resolved, both generally and in the particular circumstances of this case. Needless to say, perhaps, we await decision with much anticipation.

None of the others joined in our brief should be called to answer for what I have written above. It is no more than my “take” on our work together embodied in the brief itself.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

The Succession of Kosovo and Minimum Public Order
[Tai-Heng Cheng is Associate Professor of Law at New York Law School. His most recent book is State Succession and Commercial Obligations.]

I am grateful to Roger Alford for inviting me to share some thoughts on the recent developments in Kosovo.

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s parliament voted to declare independence from Serbia. This unilateral declaration accelerated the international decision-making process on the status of Kosovo, and requires a collective international response.

As Julian Ku noted on Opinio Juris earlier this week, decision-makers and scholars should examine their “policy preferences” regarding whether to support the succession of Kosovo from Serbia. I would add that should the international community decide to accept Kosovo’s succession claim, international actors should manage the consequences of succession to minimize disruptions to world public order and protect the human rights of all parties involved.

Appraising Kosovo’s Succession Claim. Chris Borgen has accurately pointed out that states have to decide whether or not to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. If I understand Professor Borgen’s post, in his view such recognition is merely declarative and not constitutive. If Kosovo meets the criteria for statehood, then non-recognition does not invalidate its statehood. This view might find some support in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, concluded on December 26, 1933 in Montevideo. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention suggests the criteria for statehood: “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” None of these four criteria explicitly depend on recognition.

As a practical matter, however, if a substantial number of states reject Kosovo’s succession claim by withholding recognition, these states would be hard pressed (although not absolutely precluded, if the unique status of Taiwan provides any indication) to enter into diplomatic relations with Kosovo, to conclude treaties with it, or to grant it sovereign immunity independently of Serbia. In such a situation, regardless of whether scholars think Kosovo has become a state, it would not be able to fully function as a state in the international system. The reality is therefore that recognition serves a key constitutive function in the process of succession.

Policy-makers in each state should consider the consequences of granting or denying recognition to Kosovo. The Security Council reaffirmed in Resolution 1244, a Chapter VII decision, an international commitment to “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo.” Withholding recognition might encourage Serbia to resist this international decision. Granting recognition would compress the time frame for a negotiated settlement on the international consequences of Kosovo’s succession, thereby probably precluding seamless transition like the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1991, or the transfers of Hong Kong and Macau to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively. But it would achieve the policy-goal of providing Kosovo with autonomy and self-administration.

Managing the Impact of Kosovo’s Succession. Should the world community generally accept Kosovo’s claim to statehood, the international community must manage the disruptions to preexisting international arrangements.

There are currently few, if any, crystallized rules regarding the effects of state succession on preexisting international obligations. Every succession has unique variables and intense political pressures that have precluded the formation of customary law through consistent state practice and opinio juris. The Vienna Convention on Succession in Respect of Treaties of 1978 has entered into force, but lacks widespread ratification and binds only its handful of signatories. The Vienna Convention on Succession in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 1983 was so controversial that it never entered into force.

Human Rights. In the absence of international legal rules on succession, Kosovo should rapidly accede to preexisting multilateral treaties, especially constitutive human rights treaties. This would minimize disruptions to the international human rights program, affirm Kosovo’s commitment to prevent the repetition of human rights abuses inflicted on Kosovars, reassure its Serbian minority, and, importantly, confirm its capacity to enter into treaties and its status as a state.

Investment Treaties. Serbia’s Investment and Export Protection Agency reports that Serbia has entered into 34 bilateral investment treaties, including with the USA, UK, Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Greece. In 2007, it also ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. Kosovo should rapidly confirm through bilateral exchanges of diplomatic notes that Serbia’s BITs bind Kosovo, subject to modifications that may be necessary to accommodate Kosovo’s economic circumstances. If the World Bank will permit it, Kosovo should also confirm the continuity of the ICSID Convention. This strategy will help to further consolidate Kosovo’s attainment of statehood, and help minimize disruptions to the international economy.

External Debt. There is also the thorny issue of Serbia’s debt, estimated at $25 billion in November 2007. In the current volatile global economy, markets will need reassurance that this debt will be repaid. In past successions, such as the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, creditors have initially proposed that the successor states assume joint and several liabilities for preexisting debt. Eventually, however, they accepted in negotiated settlements proportional allocations of debt among successor states, and substantial debt reduction or rescheduling to accommodate the limited economic capacities of the new states.

Annex VI of the Ahtisaari Plan, to which Professor Borgen has referred in his prior blog post, proposes a negotiated settlement between Kosovo and Serbia. Under this negotiated settlement, “allocated external debt shall become a liability of Kosovo where the final beneficiary is located in Kosovo; non-allocated external debt shall be apportioned to the parties according to a proportional key to be established by agreement between the parties, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund.” In a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns assumed that Kosovo would share a burden of Serbia’s debt. He also noted that that the President’s 2008 budget included $151 million in aid to Kosovo, and anticipated three times that amount in international contributions from other donors.

Kosovo would be well-served by commencing debt negotiations with Serbia’s creditors immediately, regardless of whether Serbia is willing to negotiate with Kosovo at this point in time. This would signal to capital markets that Kosovo is a responsible sovereign state and help ensure access to further funds, which will be critical for Kosovo’s sustainable development. The risk that Serbia’s debts will debilitate Kosovo is limited by the availability of substantial international aid, as well as the trend in recent successions to negotiate debt repayment on reasonable terms. Creditors ultimately have no interest in imposing such onerous conditions that the successor state defaults.

In making these recommendations, I acknowledge Robert Sloane’s warning, in his thoughtful essay, “The Policies of Self-Determination: Harmonizing Self-Determination and Global Order in the Twenty-First Century, 30 Fordham Journal of International Law 1288, 1316 (2007), that policy-makers should not allow a focus on the global commercial dimensions in state succession to “obscure or minimize other fundamental values at stake.” The analysis here of next steps in the Kosovo situation is necessarily preliminary. Nonetheless, I hope I have outlined what Henry Perritt has described in 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 129 (2007) as “a constructive approach to working out the complicated succession issues embedded in a decision over the final status of Kosovo.”

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Consular Relations With Filipino Dancers
Who could have thought a tax case could be so ... exotic? On remand from the Supreme Court in the case of New York City v. Permanent Mission of India, Judge Rakoff was required to rule on whether New York City could recover property taxes from the Philippines, India, and Mongolia on portions of buildings used for non-consular purposes. But in order to do so the court had to distinguish between consular and non-consular purposes.

In the case of the Philippines, some of the property was leased by the Philippines government to a Philippine restaurant, Philippine bank (PNB), and Philippine airline (PAL). The question was whether any of those entities were performing consular functions within the meaning of the VCCR. The court ruled that the restaurant, but not the bank, was performing consular functions. The court was also quite emphatic that they did not have consular relations with that airline, PAL.

As the court noted, Article 5 of the VCCR "defines the purposes of a consular post broadly, by reference to its functions, i.e., 'furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State', 'protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals', 'ascertaining ... conditions and developments in the commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life of the receiving state, reporting thereon to the Government of the sending state', and 'helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State.'"

In assessing whether the restaurant performed such functions, the Court noted that from 1974 to 1982 the Philippine Center leased property to the Maharlika Restaurant, which "served authentic Filipino cuisine, employed Filipinos only, and was staffed with a Filipino dance troupe and musicians who performed a show during dinner. Through its culinary offerings and the evening performance, Maharlika showcased Philippine culture, folk art, ethnic music and dance to guests of the Mission and the Consulate General."

That was good enough for the court to find that the restaurant fell within the definition of consular relations. The purpose of the restaurant was to showcase Filipino culture, not to earn a profit. It did so by hiring only Filipino employees, presenting long Filipino dinner shows, and hosting official Philippine functions. "Maharlika was thus used exclusively for a consular purpose, and so is exempt under the VCCR."

I love it. As long as there is Filipino dancing you fall within Article 5's definition of "furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State." As for the lease with the Philippine bank and Philippine airline, no that just won't do. Far too much focus on Filipino commercial and economic relations, and not nearly enough emphasis on Filipino culture.

Now if the bank tellers had just doubled as Filipino dancers while serving customers, well, ... who knows, perhaps Filipino "teller and dancing" would suffice. Based on this YouTube video of the well-known Bayanihan Philippine Dance Company, it looks like they could multi-task.




Friday, February 15, 2008

The Coming Immigration Revolution
The Pew Research Center just published a fascinating new poll on the future of immigration in the United States. Here are a few of the key results:


If current trends continue, the population of the United States will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and 82% of the increase will be due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to 2050 and their U.S.-born descendants, according to new projections developed by the Pew Research Center.

Of the 117 million people added to the population during this period due to the effect of new immigration, 67 million will be the immigrants themselves and 50 million will be their U.S.-born children or grandchildren.

Among the other key population projections:

Nearly one in five Americans (19%) will be an immigrant in 2050, compared with one in eight (12%) in 2005. By 2025, the immigrant, or foreign-born, share of the population will surpass the peak during the last great wave of immigration a century ago.

The major role of immigration in national growth builds on the pattern of recent decades, during which immigrants and their U.S.-born children and grandchildren accounted for most population increase. Immigration’s importance increased as the average number of births to U.S.-born women dropped sharply before leveling off.

The Latino population, already the nation’s largest minority group, will triple in size and will account for most of the nation’s population growth from 2005 through 2050. Hispanics will make up 29% of the U.S. population in 2050, compared with 14% in 2005.

Births in the United States will play a growing role in Hispanic and Asian population growth; as a result, a smaller proportion of both groups will be foreign-born in 2050 than is the case now.

The non-Hispanic white population will increase more slowly than other racial and ethnic groups; whites will become a minority (47%) by 2050.

The nation’s elderly population will more than double in size from 2005 through 2050, as the baby boom generation enters the traditional retirement years. The number of working-age Americans and children will grow more slowly than the elderly population, and will shrink as a share of the total population.

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Rational Choice Explanations for Human Rights Treaties
Let me just offer a quick additional reflection on the question of whether rational choice theory may help explain the conundrum of why states sign human rights treaties.

The easiest explanation is when the human rights commitment is bundled together with other provisions in a treaty, and the cost of making the human rights commitment is offset by other benefits derived from the treaty. The Helsinki Accords are the obvious example, with the USSR receiving significant benefits from provisions such as the territorial integrity of States, while committing itself to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The rational choice explanation is obvious within the confines of the treaty itself.

Most human rights treaties are not of this nature. As for free-standing human rights treaties, a rational choice assumption would be that the cost of adhering to a human rights treaty must be offset by some greater good external to the treaty. Two possibilities come to mind, one international and the other domestic. In some cases, a country may wish to sign a human rights treaty to procure some greater international benefit. For example, the choice of some eastern European countries to sign the European Convention on Human Rights can be explained by their desire to secure admission to the European Union. And of course, foreign aid is often conditioned on adherence to human rights treaties. It is quite rational for developing countries to make human rights commitments for the sake procuring foreign aid.

In other cases the benefit may have nothing to do with international relations. If I understand Andrew correctly from his last post, he assumes that the internalization of a norm is a departure from rational choice assumptions. I’m not sure this is correct. I would think that a state could make the rational choice to suffer the cost of adhering to a human rights treaty in order to secure a domestic benefit. The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is a good example. CEDR was pushed through the General Assembly by a majority bloc of newly-independent developing countries from Africa and Asia. But there is a rational choice explanation for why the United States quickly came on board: the international cost of adherence was offset by a domestic benefit. The Johnson Administration was under intense domestic pressure from the civil rights movement to show progress on racial equality, and adherence to an international treaty was one such clear signal.

Rational choice explanations of international law cannot divorce international costs from domestic benefits. All that matters is that there is some rational explanation for why states make international commitments. The explanation may be of a horizontal nature between nations, or of a vertical nature within the state itself.


Friday, February 8, 2008

Final Thoughts
Once again, thanks to Roger Alford and everyone else involved with Opinio Juris for a rich discussion and an excellent example of how the Internet can facilitate in-depth exchanges.

I wrote God and Gold hoping to set off a conversation about some important and often uncomfortable truths:

that the modern world has developed under the auspices of an ever growing and deepening system of politics, culture, economics and ideology rooted in capitalist social organization and Anglo-American power;

that this long era of Anglo-American predominance in world affairs rests in large part on a unique cultural fit between those societies and the challenges of rapid capitalist development;

that this cultural fit is best understood in the light of a dynamic religious sensibility that infuses both orthodox and heterodox religious faith in the Anglo-American world;

that this religious sensibility continues to shape the perceptions and values of secular as well as religious people in the United States today;

that both the cultural and the geopolitical conditions of today’s world seem favorable to the continuation of the “American era” in world affairs well into the present century;

that much of the world objects to various features of this international system and that these objections are often deeply rooted in cultural and political preferences which will not easily or quickly be changed (and which in any case many people want to preserve);

that the Anglo-Americans are not and often have not been wise, generous or just in their use of the power they’ve achieved;

that the very cultural qualities which have helped make the Anglo-Americans so strong tend to blind them to certain important features of the emerging world system;

that the accelerating social and technological changes which liberal capitalism promotes are simultaneously liberating and destabilizing;

that while it is impossible to predict where all this is heading, humanity seems fated to continue along this path.

At least from where I sit this does not look like a triumphalist message. I respect the power of Whig optimism to shape world affairs, but I cannot share the easy optimism that the Whig tradition promotes. My own view of the future is a bit darker and more Delphic than the intoxicating and enticing visions of a peaceful, stable and democratic world order resting on capitalism and the rule of law which so many British and American observers have thought they discerned during the last couple of centuries. I honestly do not know where all this will end, and I am sometimes staggered at the perils we face.

In the end I do share the Abrahamic faith that all the turmoil and trauma of human history will lead to something greater and richer than anything we now know, but I suspect that the consummation of history will be something more unsettling and unexpected than a peaceful and easy transition to the Paradise of Whigs.