Opinio Juris

Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U.S.C. § 1, and since a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment is affirmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances the Court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided Court. The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

In 1986, while the U.S.-Canada Convention was in force, Congress amended the AMT imposed on noncorporate taxpayers by section 55 and added section 59 to the Code.... [Thereafter] the U.S.-Canada Convention was amended.... The revised Protocol Amending the Convention... made changes to Article XXIV affecting credits for Social Security tax, corporate tax exemptions, and the tax treatment of dividends, interest, and royalties,... but did not alter the general rule found in article XXIV, paragraph 1. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol references section 59 [the earlier conflicting statutory provision].

It is well established that, where a statute and a treaty pertain to the same subject matter, they must be read so as to give effect to both if at all possible.... If, however, the statute and the treaty conflict, the last-in-time rule requires that “the last expression of the sovereign will ... [controls].”...

Applying the last-in-time rule, we hold that section 59(a)(2) is the last expression of the sovereign will and that it takes precedence over the U.S.-Canada Convention to the extent there is a conflict between them. [The statute] makes it very clear that Congress intended the limitation of section 59(a)(2) to supersede existing treaty provisions prohibiting double taxation. The U.S.-Canada Convention was one of those treaties. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol contains any provision clearly indicating that Congress's intention to ensure that taxpayers with sufficient means should contribute a minimum amount of tax to the United States had been superseded.

[O]ne question that interests me but is a little divorced from the terms of the arguments so far. I know it is not popular to refer to refer to international commentary on issues like this, but the English law lords have filed an amicus brief discussing the international principle that nations that retain the death penalty may not extend the death penalty to crimes to which it does not presently apply. They suggest that as a matter of international law, there's sort of a correspondence to our evolving standards of decency that have generally governed our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. It's kind of a one-way rachet, we look at trends in one direction but we don't look to see if you suddenly have changed gears and go in the other direction. Could you just comment on that argument?... I just use[] that as an analogy to our evolving standards of decency cases which has been part of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, that sort of is a — one way direction in which these cases go. Do you think it's appropriate — are you aware of any case saying we can turn around and go in another direction?

International authorities have long agreed that nations that retain the death penalty must refrain from expanding the death penalty to crimes to which it currenlty does not apply--a principle that has been codified in a regional convention and reaffirmed by the jurisprudence of human rights bodies. There is an equally strong global consensus that nations should gradually narrow the categories of offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed.

158. It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been adopted by the DSB….

160. Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members attach significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system. Ensuring "security and predictability" in the dispute settlement system … implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.

161. In the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body have distinct roles to play…. The Panel's failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Members' rights and obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated under the DSU….

162. We are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel's approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system ….

You really, really should follow prior Appellate Body decisions. It would be quite bad for the system if you do not. But if you've got what you think are compelling reasons for not doing so, we understand if you feel you have to go your own way. Bearing in mind, of course, that if you do, we will almost certainly reverse you on appeal. You may think your reasons are pretty good, but if they were really that persuasive we would have gone that way ourselves, hence they are not, in fact, "cogent".

The projections make it clear that U.S. corporate law firms of the future will be wealthier, larger, and more international than they were in the past…. Six firms … will gross more than $10 billion: Kirkland & Ellis; Mayer Brown; Baker & McKenzie; Jones Day; Skadden; and Latham. By 2025 Latham, at $23 billion, will have dramatically outpaced Skadden, its nearest competitor at $15.9 billion.

The PPP [profits-per-partner] projections for 2025 have Wachtell partners bringing home almost $15.7 million (before adjusting for inflation). Cravath, Swaine & Moore's PPP will be $9.6 million; Skadden's $6 million; and Baker & McKenzie's $2.5 million. The highest 2025 projected profits per partner are at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, where the model suggests partners will net nearly $20 million apiece in 2025….

White & Case is projected to be the biggest of the 47 firms in the analysis, with 13,824 lawyers; Baker & McKenzie will follow closely behind with 13,512. More than three-quarters of the lawyers at both firms will be based outside the United States. Jones Day will have 11,623 lawyers and Latham 11,066, of whom almost 40 percent will be international….

And as the roster of firms atop the PPP and RPL projections indicates, the gap between firms will grow ever larger. The rich will continue to get richer and the poor relatively poorer…. Big firms will become bigger relative to smaller firms; and firms with a strong international presence will stand in greater contrast to those firms that have a minimal or no international presence.

These projections present numerous challenges and opportunities for firms in The Am Law 200. For firms to maintain the growth rates they established in the last 20 years-the rates that resulted in these optimistic predictions-they will have to grapple with a number of critical questions:

Will the market for high-end corporate legal services continue to expand? The projections assume that demand will continue to grow at historic rates. For that to happen, however, law firms will have to penetrate or create new markets, whether in other countries or new practice areas. …

How will the firms of the future manage the complexities of their ever-increasing size and geographical scope? The firm of the past had a few hundred lawyers. Several firms today have more than 1,000-but in 20 years, a 1,000-lawyer firm will be midsize. And firms will be much more geographically dispersed. Managing complexity will require that firm leaders continually develop and market their firm's expertise, while at the same time nurturing talent.

What will be the organizational identity of firms with an increasing percentage of lawyers outside the U.S.? A number of firms will cross the threshold and become global operations, no longer just U.S. firms with an international presence. Will such firms suffer identity crises? Will they be able to create a global identity that unites their partners worldwide?

Will firms that have avoided international expansion be able to continue to grow? Projections suggest that in 2025 Wachtell will still be wholly domestic and Cravath will have only about 6 percent of its lawyers outside the U.S. If the market forces them to move to a more global model, they may suffer significant financial and cultural costs, especially if they have to move quickly. Domestic firms with less marketable reputations may be hurt even more if they have to play global catch-up….

The plaintiffs in this case allege they were injured as a result of an accident that occurred on an up escalator as they exited an area the parties describe as a “bus depot,” located one level below Main Concourse E at the airport, when Mrs. Ferguson, Mrs. Deleveaux's eighty-eight-year-old mother, apparently fell backward onto both Ms. Bowe and Mrs. Deleveaux, resulting in all three suffering personal injuries. The complaint alleges the defendants were negligent by failing to fulfill a request for wheelchair assistance made for Mrs. Ferguson, which caused the plaintiffs to fend for themselves and hence, the escalator accident.

The record reflects the accident in this case occurred on July 29, 2001. Ms. Bowe, Mrs. Deleveaux, and Mrs. Ferguson had just arrived in Miami on an American Eagle commuter aircraft from Nassau. The aircraft arrived at a freestanding building, separate from the main concourse. In accordance with practice for aircraft arriving at that location, Ms. Bowe, Mrs. Deleveaux, and Mrs. Ferguson departed the aircraft and boarded an American Airlines bus for the short trip to the main terminal. The bus brought them to the bus depot. Although it appears from the record the bus depot is served by two escalators and an elevator, at best the record is murky concerning ingress, egress, and the extent to which the general passenger populace on the concourses is free to enter the depot area….

The preemptive effect of the Convention on local law extends no further than the Convention's own substantive scope. In this regard, it is clear from the text of the Convention it applies only to a “carrier.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17. In addition, the Convention applies only to injuries occurring either on board an aircraft or “in the course of any operations of embarking or disembarking.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17. These requirements constitute the initial inquiries we must make to determine whether the Convention is applicable to the claims being made and those we must consider here….

The Warsaw Convention also does not define or elucidate upon the phrase “operations of embarking or disembarking.” See Warsaw Convention, art. 17. However, it is clear the term does not automatically exclude events transpiring, as is the case here, within an airline terminal building. Rather than impose location-based or other rigid criteria to delimit these periods of liability under the Warsaw Convention, courts employ a three-prong test or guide to determine whether a passenger is entitled to seek the benefits of the Convention by considering: (1) the passenger's activity at the time of the accident; (2) the passenger's whereabouts at the time of the accident; and (3) the amount of control being exercised by the carrier at the time of the injury. In addition, when considering these factors, these same courts have made clear that no single factor is dispositive. Instead, “the three factors form a ‘single, unitary [analytical] base.'"

A relatively straight line runs from the positions on the ICC taken by our Congress in 1990, to those of U.S. negotiators in Rome, to President Clinton’s decision not to seek Senate ratification of the Rome Statute and to recommend the same to his successor, and to the current position of the Bush Administration.

Even if a future President were to advocate U.S. accession to the Rome Statute, he or she could very well face a skeptical reaction in the U.S. Senate. It’s worth bearing in mind that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act – legislation that was not sought by the Bush Administration and that includes a range of restrictions on U.S. support for the ICC – passed the Senate in 2002 by a vote of 75-19, including the affirmative votes of Senators Clinton and McCain, as well as those of the current Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, Senators Reid and McConnell.

The core concerns of the United States about the Rome Statute have not been resolved during the past decade, and are unlikely to be resolved in the next decade, unless the Statute is changed. Accordingly, as we look forward, the United States will very likely remain outside the Rome Statute regime. This is a reality that ICC supporters should accept. Agreeing to disagree about the ICC is the essential first step toward developing a more mature and productive relationship that can effectively advance our shared goal of promoting international criminal justice. This will involve seizing opportunities for cooperative efforts where they exist and avoiding pitfalls that risk reigniting past tensions. We should be guided in our efforts by the premise that the ends we seek are far more important than the means by which we seek them. The United States and ICC supporters can do more to prevent impunity for serious crimes by working together than either can achieve on their own, and it is in our mutual interest to develop a relationship that recognizes this.

It is important that we put aside our differences on these issues because the next decade poses challenges that will require our collective efforts as well as pitfalls that risk further inflaming tensions over ICC issues. Let me now discuss a few issues that I think will shape the relationship between the United States and the ICC in the coming years.

A first area relates to the response to large scale and horrific crimes in Darfur. Absent a decision by the ICC to pursue an investigation or prosecution against a U.S. person, the outcome of the ICC’s Darfur work is likely to do more than any other factor in the near term to shape U.S. perceptions of the role and impact of the ICC…. Darfur is … a good example of an area where, with respect and goodwill on all sides, there may be opportunities for constructive cooperation….

A second more general area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC in the coming years will be the impact of the ICC’s work on the UN Security Council…. Now that the ICC is a reality, it will be important to the United States to ensure that the work of the ICC complements the work of the Council to maintain international peace and security…. As the ICC proceeds to investigate and prosecute cases under the Rome Statute, the Security Council must be prepared to act if and when necessary to ensure harmony between the ICC’s work and the Council’s broader efforts....

A final area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC is the outcome of the upcoming Rome Statute review conference, now scheduled for 2010. If Rome Statute parties were interested in trying to address the core U.S. concerns about the ICC, the Review Conference could provide an opportunity to do so. These issues aside, a principal focus of work of the conference will likely relate to proposals to define a crime of aggression over which the ICC could exercise jurisdiction…. Efforts to design an aggression regime for the ICC will also need to address the regime’s applicability to countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute. As I have noted, a core principle of our ICC policy is that, as we acknowledge the decisions of other states to join the Rome Statute and to submit to its jurisdiction, we ask that other states accept our decision not to do so. In this context, should Rome Statute parties seek to make an aggression regime they adopt applicable to non-parties, they will almost certainly provoke a serious new crisis in the ICC’s relationship with a new U.S. Administration.

One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litigation against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is pursued while the principal evades punishment. Indeed, if a corporation is accused of "aiding and abetting" human rights abuses, this is all but a concession that the corporate actor is not the principal wrongdoer. It is of course possible that this controversial trend toward corporate responsibility may reflect a genuine concern about corporate abuse of power. But more likely it reflects an abiding frustration that the primary perpetrators-sovereigns-are beyond the reach of most victims. If victims cannot pursue claims against the principal, they will resign themselves to pursue claims against those who aid and abet.

How have we come to this state of affairs, in which the corporation is pursued while the sovereign evades punishment? Why should the corporate accomplice alone be found liable if the sovereign is the primary malfeasor? For the first time in scholarly literature, this Article suggests an alternative approach, a solution to this conundrum. It suggests that corporations have existing tools to remedy the situation, drawing on principles derived from human rights, contract law, and arbitration. The essential idea is that if a corporation is found liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuse, it may invoke contractual provisions in the agreement with the sovereign to arbitrate the question of shared responsibility. While the victims may not pursue the sovereign, there is no impediment for a corporation that is found liable to pursue the sovereign in arbitration to secure its share of liability, either in the form of contribution or indemnification. In short, human rights litigation against the corporation could lead to "who pays" arbitration against the sovereign….

The purpose of this Article is not to affirm or disaffirm this trend of holding corporations liable under international law. Rather its purpose is to recognize an observable trend in human rights litigation patterns and consider its ramifications. If corporations increasingly are subject to international responsibility, then this portends new avenues for holding sovereigns responsible for their share of the liability….

Human rights litigation followed by "who pays" arbitration is a two-step process that overcomes the traditional immunity that sovereigns enjoy in human rights litigation. Thus far, human rights litigants have attempted to scale an impregnable wall of sovereign immunity by relying on awkward FSIA tools such as commercial activity or implied waivers. But corporations have no such difficulties. They can invoke provisions in their contracts that were specifically drafted to fulfill the relatively straightforward FSIA exceptions of express waiver and arbitration. Corporations typically cannot implead and crossclaim against the sovereign in the underlying litigation. But they can do the next best thing by arbitrating the question of who pays for the human rights abuses. Effectively, the arbitration procedure operates as a second-tier cross-claim by one malfeasor against the other.

What is particularly important about this paradigm shift is that heretofore human rights abuse has been a relatively cost-free enterprise for perpetrators, particularly sovereigns…. But with corporate liability that equation changes dramatically. To use Guido Calabresi's scheme of cost avoidance, monetary incentives are placed on corporations to change their conduct so as to reduce the number and severity of human rights violations…. And by imposing a cost on corporations that aid and abet sovereign abuse, those corporations will become cost avoiders…. Holding corporations liable and then arbitrating who pays is a mechanism of imposing costs and then spreading the costs, resulting in the corporation and the sovereign becoming cost avoiders. By imposing and spreading costs to the secondary and primary perpetrators, greater fairness between the malfeasors is achieved and deterrence from human rights abuse is enhanced. Contractual arbitration between the corporation and the sovereign over who pays transfers costs imposed on the corporation and creates shared incentives to implement and enforce human rights obligations.

This continued litigation under the ATS reflects fundamental problems with how lower courts have approached these suits. These problems center on five key issues: First, whether the ATS applies extraterritorially – that is, whether a U.S. court can properly apply U.S. federal common law under the ATS to conduct that occurred entirely in the territory of a foreign State. Second, even if such a cause of action could properly be recognized, whether exhaustion of adequate and available local remedies in that foreign country should be a prerequisite to bringing an ATS suit. Third, whether corporations or other private entities may be held liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting human rights abuses perpetrated by foreign governments. A fourth issue is how to apply Sosa’s requirement that an international-law norm be sufficiently accepted and specific. And fifth, in what circumstances should courts dismiss suits based on what Sosa referred to as “case-specific deference to the political branches”?

We are perceived, accurately, as having in effect established an International Civil Court – a court with jurisdiction to decide cases brought by foreigners arising anywhere in the world, by the light only of its own divination of universal law, and through the extraterritorial application of U.S. law concerning rights and remedies. By itself, this can be grating enough to foreign governments. But it is especially so when taken together with both the fact that the U.S. often argues vigorously against the assertion by foreign courts of universal jurisdiction to hear cases involving U.S. officials, and the fact that the U.S. has declined to join the International Criminal Court because of concerns about that tribunal’s jurisdiction.

The Executive Branch has real interests in ensuring that as a matter of policy, ATS litigation does not interfere with its conduct of foreign relations. I have already noted foreign governments’ concerns about the scope of U.S. court jurisdiction under the ATS. In addition, recent ATS suits have been used by litigants to duplicate, replace, or proceed on top of the U.S. government’s systemic efforts to reform foreign government practices or help end foreign conflicts. Often, these suits are brought as class actions for all aliens injured by the challenged conduct, effectively asking the U.S. courts to serve as administrator of an international claims program for foreign nationals.

Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see [the relevant provisions of the FAA] as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process,” and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process....

When all these arguments based on prior legal authority are done with, Hall Street and Mattel remain at odds over what happens next. Hall Street and its amici say parties will flee from arbitration if expanded review is not open to them. One of Mattel's amici foresees flight from the courts if it is. We do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say whether the exclusivity reading of the statute is more of a threat to the popularity of arbitrators or to that of courts. But whatever the consequences of our holding, the statutory text gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds.

The firearms death rate in the United States far surpasses that of other democratic nations. A 1997 study analyzing firearms deaths for children aged 14 or under in 26 industrialized countries found that 86 percent of all deaths occurred in the United States. The rate for firearms homicide alone was 16 times higher in the United States, while the firearms suicide rate was 11 times higher and the firearms unintentional death rate was nine times higher.

In 1995, the firearms death rate in the United States was 13.7 per 100,000. In comparison, the firearms death rates in countries that severely limit access to handguns were significantly lower. For example, in 1995, Canada had a firearms death rate of 3.9 per 100,000; Australia had a rate of 2.9 per 100,000; and England and Wales had rates of 0.4 per 100,000. One of the most glaring distinctions between these countries and the United States is the significantly lower incidents of lethal violence caused by handguns.

Criminological research has established that the high rate of handgun homicides in the United *7 States is due, at least in part, to the high rate of handgun ownership in the United States. The rate of handgun ownership and the rate of handgun homicides in the United States, when compared to the same data from other countries, illustrate the strong correlation between the availability of handguns and the incidence of handgun homicides.... [T]he United States experiences about four times the level of handgun homicides per 100,000 people than Israel, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain combined.

The use of handguns in suicide in no way proves that an alternative method would not be used if handguns were unavailable. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Japan, Hungary, and Scandinavia all have far more restrictive gun control than the United States, and yet they have suicide rates 2 to 3 times higher than the U.S. For example, the suicide rate in Hungary is 35.38 per 100,000, compared to only 12.06 per 100,000 in the United States.

The AAP Brief relies on a country-by-country comparison in arguing that the firearm related death rate in the United States was much higher in 1995 in the United States than in Canada, Australia, and England and Wales, all of which have restrictive gun control. AAP Brief at 25. But the data for gun deaths in the United States include guns used in self-defense, as in fending off an assault, robbery or rape, and higher homicide rates in the United States existed long before there was gun control in other countries….

Different societies have different confounding factors, such as crime-inducing drug addiction, single-parent families, promotion of violence in the media, and varying approaches to juvenile delinquency and schooling, all of which inevitably affect crime rates. Those confounding factors are best eliminated by looking at the effect of gun control on the same society, and as shown below, gun control typically results in an increase in overall crime rather than a reduction. Gun control is hardly supported if murders by switchblades increase as death by firearms declines.

The evidence from foreign jurisdictions leads to the same conclusion as the United States data. In general, comparison of “homicide and suicide mortality data for thirty-six nations (including the United States) for the period 1990-1995” to gunstock levels shows “no significant (at the 5% level) association between gun ownership and the total homicide rate.” Additionally, in a 2001 European study of 21 nations' data, “no significant correlations [of gunstock levels] with total suicide or homicide rates were found.”…

A 2007 study compared gun ownership and murder in every European nation on which the data could be found. Again, nations with more guns did not exhibit higher murder rates. Indeed, the tendency is generally the opposite: murder rates for the seven nations having 16,000+ guns average out to 1.2 per 100,000 population while the murder rates for the nine nations having just 5,000 or fewer guns is well over three times higher, at 4.4 per 100,000. These national comparisons suggest that the determinants of murder are factors such as basic socio-economic and cultural factors, and not the mere availability of guns. Leading gun control advocates have admitted that “Israel and Switzerland [have] rates of homicide [that] are low despite rates of home firearm ownership that are at least as high as those noted in the U.S.” To the same effect, within Canada, “England, America and Switzerland, [the areas] with the highest rates of gun ownership are in fact those with the lowest rates of violence.”