Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Friday, April 25, 2008

Medellin Applied: VCCR Does Not Create a Private Right of Action
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has taken the first crack at applying the Supreme Court's recent decision in Medellin with respect to self-executing treaties. In Mora v. People of New York, the Second Circuit rejected a foreign national's effort to win damages for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Interestingly, the Second Circuit, buttressed by Medellin's analysis of self-execution, held that a clear statement is required before a treaty will be read to create an individual private right. No such clear statement can be found in the VCCR under Article 36 and therefore no damages action under Section 1983 or the Alien Tort Statute can be sustained.

This seems like the right result. It is narrower and more defensible than Medellin because it limits the clear statement rule to the creation of private rights of action rather than self-execution in general. Still, a tricky issue and a worthy effort at resolving it from the Second Circuit.

Thursday, April 24, 2008

Why Training Journalists in International Law is a Good Thing
The American Society of International Law has recently begun partnering with journalism schools in an effort to introduce international law to future reporters and editorial boards. And, publications like ASIL Insightsand IL.Post are circulated broadly among media outlets, and ASIL makes the expertise of its membership available when issues or cases arise in which explanations of the law can be helpful. But, as Jose Alvarez noted in this interview with the State Department Information Service, we still have a way to go. This recent editorial about Medellin v. Texas in the Augusta Chronicle is a case in point. How many errors can you spot in this piece?

The Right Ruling
Supreme Court Renders Sound Judgment in Standing up for Sovereignty
Augusta Chronicle Editorial Staff
Friday, April 18, 2008

Americans have had their quarrels with many past U.S. Supreme Court rulings, but the Supremes certainly got it right in Medellin v. the State of Texas. Despite opposition from the Bush administration, and many in Congress, the justices affirmed U.S. sovereignty over the World Court.

The case involved Jose Medellin, a Mexican native who along with five other gang members was convicted in a Houston, Texas, court 15 years ago of the brutal rape and murder of two teenage girls. Medellin's death sentence was upheld by the Texas Supreme Court, but in 2003 the Mexican government got involved, taking the case to the International Court of Justice, recently renamed the World Court.

Mexico charged that Medellin's rights were violated because at no point during his arrest and trial was he informed that under the Vienna Convention - an international treaty signed by the United States in 1963 - he could get legal assistance from the Mexican consulate.

The international court ruled that the United States violated the terms of the treaty, and ordered U.S. courts to review and reconsider not only Medellin's conviction, but also that of 50 other Mexican-born convicts on death row throughout the nation. President Bush agreed, and told state courts to comply with the international court's edict - in effect, subordinating U.S. law to a foreign jurisdiction.

Texas wasted no time in appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, which recently ruled in Texas' favor. Writing for the justices' 6-3 majority, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that U.S. courts are not always obligated to enforce international law - that "the judgments of an international tribunal" do not have "a higher status than that enjoyed by many of our most fundamental constitutional protections."

Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz put the ruling in proper perspective: "The United States Constitution vests sovereignty in the Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, the president, the 50 states and, ultimately, in we the people. Had Medellin prevailed, American sovereignty and independence would have been gravely undermined."

Indeed, it would have been - and shame on the three dissenting justices and President Bush for not understanding that.


To be sure, some of the mistakes could have been avoided with basic fact checking. But I have to believe that more knowledge of the field would be a good thing.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Sovereign Accountability for Human Rights Abuses
One of the unintended consequences of the movement to hold corporations liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses is that doing so may prove to be the most effective way of holding sovereigns accountable. That is the surprising conclusion of my latest article just published in the Notre Dame Law Review. Here is an excerpt:


One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litigation against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is pursued while the principal evades punishment. Indeed, if a corporation is accused of "aiding and abetting" human rights abuses, this is all but a concession that the corporate actor is not the principal wrongdoer. It is of course possible that this controversial trend toward corporate responsibility may reflect a genuine concern about corporate abuse of power. But more likely it reflects an abiding frustration that the primary perpetrators-sovereigns-are beyond the reach of most victims. If victims cannot pursue claims against the principal, they will resign themselves to pursue claims against those who aid and abet.

How have we come to this state of affairs, in which the corporation is pursued while the sovereign evades punishment? Why should the corporate accomplice alone be found liable if the sovereign is the primary malfeasor? For the first time in scholarly literature, this Article suggests an alternative approach, a solution to this conundrum. It suggests that corporations have existing tools to remedy the situation, drawing on principles derived from human rights, contract law, and arbitration. The essential idea is that if a corporation is found liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuse, it may invoke contractual provisions in the agreement with the sovereign to arbitrate the question of shared responsibility. While the victims may not pursue the sovereign, there is no impediment for a corporation that is found liable to pursue the sovereign in arbitration to secure its share of liability, either in the form of contribution or indemnification. In short, human rights litigation against the corporation could lead to "who pays" arbitration against the sovereign….

The purpose of this Article is not to affirm or disaffirm this trend of holding corporations liable under international law. Rather its purpose is to recognize an observable trend in human rights litigation patterns and consider its ramifications. If corporations increasingly are subject to international responsibility, then this portends new avenues for holding sovereigns responsible for their share of the liability….

Human rights litigation followed by "who pays" arbitration is a two-step process that overcomes the traditional immunity that sovereigns enjoy in human rights litigation. Thus far, human rights litigants have attempted to scale an impregnable wall of sovereign immunity by relying on awkward FSIA tools such as commercial activity or implied waivers. But corporations have no such difficulties. They can invoke provisions in their contracts that were specifically drafted to fulfill the relatively straightforward FSIA exceptions of express waiver and arbitration. Corporations typically cannot implead and crossclaim against the sovereign in the underlying litigation. But they can do the next best thing by arbitrating the question of who pays for the human rights abuses. Effectively, the arbitration procedure operates as a second-tier cross-claim by one malfeasor against the other.

What is particularly important about this paradigm shift is that heretofore human rights abuse has been a relatively cost-free enterprise for perpetrators, particularly sovereigns…. But with corporate liability that equation changes dramatically. To use Guido Calabresi's scheme of cost avoidance, monetary incentives are placed on corporations to change their conduct so as to reduce the number and severity of human rights violations…. And by imposing a cost on corporations that aid and abet sovereign abuse, those corporations will become cost avoiders…. Holding corporations liable and then arbitrating who pays is a mechanism of imposing costs and then spreading the costs, resulting in the corporation and the sovereign becoming cost avoiders. By imposing and spreading costs to the secondary and primary perpetrators, greater fairness between the malfeasors is achieved and deterrence from human rights abuse is enhanced. Contractual arbitration between the corporation and the sovereign over who pays transfers costs imposed on the corporation and creates shared incentives to implement and enforce human rights obligations.