Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Saturday, April 12, 2008

I'm Just a Treaty




After Medellin—which calls into question whether treaties have the status of law—I’ll be curious whether the folks at Schoolhouse Rock decide to produce a variation on the old classic cartoon, “I’m Just a Bill.” Here are some possible lyrics for a new cartoon entitled, “I’m Just a Treaty”:

You sure have to climb a lot of steps to get to the Capitol Hill in Washington
Say, I wonder what that sad little scrap of paper is…

I’m just a treaty. Yes I’m only a treaty
And I’m languishing in the capital city
Well it’s a long, long journey
To ratification by a Senate committee
It’s a long, long wait
If you’re a non-self-executing treaty
But I know I’ll be a law someday!
At least I hope and pray they take pity
But today I am still just a treaty

I’m just a treaty. Yes I’m only a treaty.
And I got as far as the capital city
Well, now I’m stuck at the Court
And I sit here and wait.
While a few key Justices
Discuss and debate
Whether they should let me be a law!
Oh, how I hope and pray they agree
But today I am still just a treaty.

I’m just a treaty. Yes I’m only a treaty.
Now I must clear congressional committees
And then I’ll be off to the White House
Where I wait in a line
With other non-self-executing treaties
For the President to sign
And if he signs me then I’ll be a law!
Oh how I hope and pray they agree
But today I am still just a treaty

It’s not easy to become a law is it? No!
Oh, how I hope and pray I will be
But today I am still just a treaty

They implemented you Treaty! Now you’re a law!
Oh yeah!


Friday, April 11, 2008

Three Cheers for José Alvarez and Lucy Reed
There are many topics that come to mind from yesterday's ASIL program, but the biggest takeaway for me came from the annual meeting with the passing of the torch from José Alvarez to Lucy Reed.

The strength of any learned society depends on its leadership and Alvarez has done an exceptional job as ASIL President. His President's columns have always been interesting and often provocative. His openness to innovation is impressive, from the promotion of ASIL West to resident Sabbatical Fellows. His commitment to junior scholars is commendable. At yesterday's panel on New Voices, he said that the presentations were so good that he thinks we should have twice as many "new voice" panels and half as many "old voice" panels. In his final Presidential Column he relates a criticism from the old guard challenging the democratization of the society. "Another pre-eminent voice of the “old guard” passed on to me recently a criticism that he had heard: namely that our annual meetings have lately resembled 'try-outs for the junior league.' I explained that our Society has shifted to more democratic, bottom-up, processes with respect to how we organize our Annual Meeting.... I remain convinced that this shift is healthy if we are to remain a membership organization that seeks to engage and to attract the whole of our members, here and abroad. It is a way to convey to prospective members and to our student members that they need not wait decades before they too will be accorded the privilege of addressing their peers." I love it.

Lucy Reed comes to the ASIL Presidency with large shoes to fill. I have known Reed for years, and I have absolutely no doubt that she will continue the tradition of outstanding leadership. She is one of the most prominent women in international arbitration, so I have watched her in action for years. I can confidently confide to anyone who does not know her that she is blessed with the Midas touch. In her inaugural speech, she emphasized her priorities as fundraising, women's rights, and continuing legal education. It will be wonderful to watch the ASIL excel under her leadership.

Of course, it is a great honor to be ASIL President. But the ASIL members should be honored that we have the likes of Alvarez and Reed as our leaders.
Who is Yoo?
John Yoo now has his own song courtesy of Harry Shearer's Le Show. It's probably not a song he or those who support him will like with its chorus of "Who is Yoo . . . Torture Memo Man." And, I suspect they'll dismiss it entirely, given its very liberal source. Still, regardless of how you feel about Yoo--and many feel quite strongly--the fact that songs are now being written about him provides further evidence of how far he (and the lawyering of the Bush Administration) have become embedded in our popular culture.
MLR's Annual Book Review Issue Released
Michigan Law Review's "2008 Survey of Books Related to the Law" is now available on-line. Two OJ'ers have review essays in the issue: yours truly, reviewing Mark Drumbl's Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law; and Roger, reviewing Ron Krotoszynski's The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom of Speech.

The issue also contains a number of essays that will interest international-law types, particularly John Yoo and Roger Delahunty's review of Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front (!); Stephen Reinhardt's review of Richard Posner's Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency; and Alex Geisinger and Michael Ashley Stein's review of Andrew Guzman's How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (the subject of an OJ symposium a few weeks ago).

Check them out!

Thursday, April 10, 2008

A Comment on No Comment
We celebrate the birth of new blogs, so it's only appropriate to mourn their passing. Scott Horton, long one of our most gifted bloggers, is officially calling it quits. The only consolation is that, freed from the onerous burden of churning out 2,000 blog words per day (!), Scott intends to devote more time to long-form journalism and legal scholarship. I, for one, look forward to both.

R.I.P., No Comment.
Supreme Court Averts War Between Delaware and New Jersey
Okay maybe not war exactly. But last month the Supreme Court rendered an interesting opinion resolving a bitter border dispute between Delaware and New Jersey. Just how bitter? Well, according to the Court, the dispute became so heated that “Delaware considered authorizing the National Guard to protect its border from encroachment [and] one New Jersey legislator looked into recommissioning the museum-piece battleship U.S.S. New Jersey in the event that the vessel might be needed to repel an armed invasion by Delaware.” Armed invasion of the Jersey shore by the Delaware National Guard?

What could have led these two states to almost come to blows? Of course, oil. Well, okay not oil exactly, but natural gas. In essence, New Jersey wanted to construct a natural gas facility in New Jersey and build a pier that extended into Delaware waters for supertankers to dock. Delaware refused to authorize this, which led New Jersey to conclude that Delaware was acting beyond the scope of its regulatory authority.

Why would Delaware not have the authority to regulate the construction of a pier within its own territory? Ordinarily it would, of course, but a 1905 Compact between the states gave New Jersey the right to build such a pier without Delaware’s approval. Or so New Jersey argued.

New Jersey read the Compact to give New Jersey “exclusive regulatory authority over all projects appurtenant to its shores, including wharves extending past the low-water mark on New Jersey's side into Delaware territory.” The Court disagreed. I won’t bore you with the details, but suffice it to say that the Court interpreted the 1905 Compact to conclude that both states had concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

So Delaware won the day and the great New Jersey War was averted. Thank goodness, otherwise the next Supreme Court case between Delaware and New Jersey would be over the interpretation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, … engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”


Will the ICC Blink on Uganda?
The long-awaited peace deal in Uganda may finally get done, according to this NYT report. But the ICC problem is not going away, since Kony is saying he will sign, but not implement the deal unless his arrest warrant is lifted. And although the ICC is talking tough, it is also showing signs they are preparing for a climbdown, at least its judges are considering it perhaps.

“The I.C.C.’s position has been over and over again that the indictments stand and they are valid,” said Maria Mabinty Kamara, a public information officer for the court in Uganda, on Thursday.

However, judges in The Hague are reviewing the case and recently sent a letter to the Ugandan government asking for more information about the country’s court systems and its capacity to try Mr. Kony.

“If for any reason the government of Uganda wants to try to get the indictments lifted, the matter is front of the judges,” Mrs. Kamara said. “I can’t say whether it is possible or not possible. It’s the business of the judges to consider.”

Can the Vice President Break a Treaty Vote Tie?
I got a chance last night (in my ASIL Conference hotel room) to catch an episode of HBO's Miniseries "John Adams" (Episode 5, "Unite or Die") and it is as good as advertised. Sure, the characters look a bit silly in their costumes, but the acting is good enough to make these historical figure seem real. And there is drama, even though everyone knows how the story will end.

But in their laudable efforts to build drama around obscure historical events like the 1795 Jay Treaty, the writers may have gone a step too far. In its dramatic climax, Vice President John Adams votes in the Senate to ratify the Jay Treaty, thus breaking a 15-15 deadlock. Jay Treaty supporters rejoice, and Adams becomes the enemy of anti-Jay Treaty Republicans.

But can the Vice President of the U.S. break a treaty vote "tie"? Not likely, given that a treaty needs two-thirds of the Senate. Hmm. I appreciate the efforts to dramatize historical events, a treaty vote no less, but still. I can't quite swallow this one.

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Mark Drumbl Defends Washington & Lee's New Curriculum
A couple of weeks ago, Roger suggested that "that W&L's new 3L experiential learning program will result in the general neglect of elective subjects such as international law." Mark Drumbl disagrees; here is his response:
Washington & Lee Law School (where I teach) recently has elected to make the third-year of its JD entirely experiential. This means a balance of clinic, externships, service, and, most importantly, practicum courses taught by permanent faculty. What is the relationship between our reforms and international law? In a recent post, Roger Alford opines they will lead to the "marginalization" of international law, which he characterizes as an "elective".

I do wish Roger had contacted Rick Kirgis or me before posting such inaccuracies. The reality couldn't be more different. The conversation we at Washington & Lee have undertaken about the pedagogical product we deliver has led us to rethink our first year, along with the "elective" nature of international and comparative law more generally. Our Curriculum Committee has just unanimously voted to implement a mandatory three-credit Transnational Law course in the first-year of our JD. This Transnational Law course pursues an integrated approach to international and comparative law. Since all students would take this course, that means they can devote their second and third years to the large number of specialized courses, theoretical research seminars, and practicum courses we offer. Keep your fingers crossed that the full faculty gets on board! I'm optimistic. If so, we would be ahead of the curve in the mainstreaming of our field.

As a result of this conversation, we have just hired four new internationalist scholars to our permanent faculty. We are very excited to have them joining us in July. We also have hired a clinician, a VAP, and a professor-of-practice with international law teaching commitments. Moreover, through our Transnational Law Institute, which was inaugurated in 2006, we offer internships abroad, a speakers' series (thus far including two ASIL Presidents), visiting scholar opportunities, and intensive courses.

Whatever one thinks of the merits of injecting more experiential learning into the JD curriculum, to conclude that such a move would threaten international law reflects an odd nervousness about the place of our field in the curriculum. Moreover, to assert - as Roger does - that international and comparative law is ill-suited for experiential learning demonstrates a lack of imagination. Our students are assisting defense lawyers in the ECCC, helping implement a UN mandate for rule of law through instruction and in-country work in Liberia, going to produce memos and assistance for public defenders in Iraq, and - with our new hires - actively jumping into litigation experiences regarding climate change and women's rights in Africa. I am not saying there is no debate on the merits of experiential learning - far from it - and it is a debate that itself only can be informed by experience. What I am saying is that there are more ways to teach international, foreign, and comparative law than simply through classroom lectures, Socratic method, and research seminars.
Readers?
Bilal Hussein To Be Released -- Maybe... (UPDATED)
Finally, some good news out of Iraq:
An Iraqi judicial committee has dismissed terrorism-related allegations against Associated Press photographer Bilal Hussein and ordered him released nearly two years after he was detained by the U.S. military.

Hussein, 36, remained in custody Wednesday at Camp Cropper, a U.S. detention facility near Baghdad's airport.

A decision by a four-judge panel said Hussein's case falls under a new amnesty law. It ordered Iraqi courts to "cease legal proceedings" and ruled that Hussein should be "immediately" released unless other accusations are pending.

The U.S. military referred the case in December to an investigating judge, who reviewed the evidence and submitted his findings to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq to determine whether the case should go to trial.

In February, however, parliament approved a law providing amnesty to those held for insurgency-related offenses — including detainees such as Hussein who have never been convicted.

The committee from the Iraqi Federal Appeals Court ruled Monday that allegations against Hussein were covered by the Anti-Terrorist Law and were subject to the amnesty law.
I have previously discussed the Bush administration's shameful attempts to engineer Hussein's conviction, as has — in far more depth — Scott Horton. It will be interesting to see what the administration does now; as the article notes, Hussein is actually in U.S. military custody. As the AP article notes, it may not let him go without a fight:
U.S. military authorities have said a U.N. Security Council mandate allows them to retain custody of a detainee they believe is a security risk even if an Iraqi judicial body has ordered that prisoner freed. The U.N. mandate is due to expire at the end of this year.

Also, the amnesty committee's ruling on Hussein may not cover a separate allegation that has been raised in connection with the case.

[snip]

In response to a question from the AP, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said it "will be up to officials in Iraq" on whether to release Hussein. The decision, he said, will be "based upon their assessment as to whether he remains a threat."

Under Iraq's 2-month-old amnesty law, a grant of amnesty effectively closes a case and does not assume guilt of the accused.

Hussein has been held by the U.S. military since being detained by Marines on April 12, 2006, in Ramadi, about 70 miles west of Baghdad. Throughout his incarceration, he has maintained he is innocent and was only doing the work of a professional news photographer in a war zone.

The amnesty committee's decision covers various allegations by the U.S. military against Hussein, including claims he was in possession of bomb-making material, conspired with insurgents to take photographs synchronized with an explosion and offered to secure a forged ID for a terrorist evading capture by the military.

The committee may still be reviewing a separate allegation that Hussein had contacts with the kidnappers of an Italian citizen, Salvatore Santoro, whose body was photographed by Hussein in December 2004 with two masked insurgents standing over Santoro with guns.

[snip]

The amnesty committee — or any Iraqi institution — cannot force the U.S. military to release or turn over any of the estimated 23,000 detainees it holds in Iraq. But a provision in the amnesty law states that the Iraqi government "is committed to take the necessary measures to move the arrested people" from U.S. control.
More later, as additional information becomes available...

UPDATE: Scott Horton provides some background on the separate allegation involving Santoro, which turns out -- not surprisingly -- to be as baseless as the other ones:
Other than the terrorism charges, the military had questioned the photographer’s presence on the scene following the abduction and killing of an Italian, Salvatore Santoro. I worked as Bilal Hussein’s counsel in 2006, and during this time I conducted a comprehensive review of the very vague allegations surrounding Santoro’s death, reviewing the documentary evidence with experts and interviewing the available witnesses. The AP photographer had been stopped with others at a check point and asked to take “trophy photos” of Santoro, who had been killed earlier in the day. A study of the photos and examination of other witnesses bore out the account, and military investigators also acknowledged off the record that there was no real basis for charges. But they continued to raise them nonetheless — apparently because they were under relentless pressure to come up with some charges.
What's the Status of the US-Canada Boundary after Medellin?
It's not often that an NPR show features treaties, but last week, Ira Glass of This American Life, had a fascinating story about the US-Canada International Boundary Commission (listen to Act 1). In short, he recounts a fight between a Bush-appointed commissioner Dennis Schornack and the Justice Department over the application of a series of treaties between the United States and Canada establishing the US-Canada boundary line and empowering two commissioners (one appointed by each side) to operate as an International Boundary Commission (IBC) with the charge of overseeing and maintaining the boundary. The current controversy combines questions of treaty interpretation, international organizations law, and constitutional law. It started as a treaty interpretation problem. Article 4 of the 1925 Boundary Demarcation Treaty provides:

The Contracting Parties, in order to provide for the maintenance of an effective boundary line between the Dominion of Canada and the United States . . . hereby agree that the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of the Treaty of April 11, 1908, are hereby jointly empowered and directed: to inspect the various sections of the boundary line . . . at such times as they shall deem necessary; to repair all damaged monuments and buoys; to relocate and rebuild monuments which have been destroyed; to keep the boundary vistas open . . . to maintain at all times an effective boundary line between the Dominion of Canada and the United States . . . as defined by the present Treaty and Treaties heretofore concluded, or hereafter to be concluded; and to determine the location of any point of the boundary line which may become necessary in the settlement of any question that may arise between the two Governments.

The Commission has evidently relied on the authority to "keep the boundary vistas open" in this treaty to maintain a 20 foot strip (ten feet on either side) free from any natural or man-made obstructions along the more than 5,000 mile boundary. For decades the two sides have stopped private property owners and others from building within the 20 foot strip to preserve this vista. And, until recently, no one had ever challenged their legal authority to do so. But when a Washington couple--Shirley-Ann and Herbert Leu--were asked by the IBC to stop building a small retaining wall less than 10 feet from the border, they sued the IBC in U.S. court and challenged its ability to interfere with their property rights. When the IBC's American Commissioner, Dennis Schornack, sought the assistance of DOJ (the State Department having told him that he represented an independent international organization that they could not help), he was surprised to learn DOJ sided with the property owners (the story never gets specific on why the Justice Department took this position; I'm assuming DOJ might argue that there's a 5th Amendement problem with maintaining the vista on private property and that under Reid v. Covert whatever the domestic legal status of U.S. treaties, they cannot contravene the Constitution). The Justice Deparment, moreover, informed Schornack that he was an agent of the Executive and could not take an independent position on the treaty's meaning, but had to adopt that of the Executive. Schornack refused, arguing that although appointed by President Bush, the treaty made him into an "independent" commissioner of an international organization, one whom the President could neither fire nor control. The Administration proceeded to replace Schorack, a move recently upheld by the District Court for the Western District of Washington on the grounds that the President's removal power was not limited by any of the US-Canada treaties setting up the IBC.

The story appears to have been put together pre-Medellin, and so I listened to it wondering what the effect of that decision would be on the domestic enforceability of the various boundary treaties, including U.S. authority to maintain the vista. For starters, I'm assuming that the Court would find the treaty text itself does not establish that it is self-executing, particularly where Canada follows the British practice of having no self-executing treaties (and, indeed, unlike the United States, Canada actually passed a law to implement the boundary, the IBC and its work). I haven't looked at the treaties' legislative histories, but given their dates of 1908 and 1925, I'd be very surprised if there's any affirmative indication by the Executive or the Senate that these treaties were intended to be self-executing. And, if that's true, under the logic of Medellin, we'd have to say the boundary treaties are not self-executing. And, if they're not self-executing, according to the Court, it appears that they are not federal law. So far so good for DOJ in reinforcing its view that authority to maintain a vista can't deprive private property owners of their right to build on their property. But, if it's true that the boundary provisions are not federal law, then what's the legal authority for enforcing the boundary line at all? Is there some statute out there that authorizes the Executive Branch to maintain the boundary line where it is and keep folks from crossing it, moving it, or building much larger obstructions than a 3 foot retaining wall? If not, could Medellin have the unintended consequence of wiping out our border with Canada until Congress legislates it?

Now, I'd assume that the courts would not go so far, even if that's the direction Medellin clearly points. For example, I'd expect that, unlike the enforcement of ICJ decisions, one could find Congress has acquiesced in the U.S.-Canada boundary. My point though is that even as Medellin clarified the long-debated doctrinal questions of what it means for a treaty to be non-self-executing, and when to find a treaty qualifies as such, it has opened up whole new areas of confusion over the current domestic legal status of treaties that were otherwise silent on the self-executing question. I'd be interested to know if any of our readers have views on this case, or other instances, where you think Medellin may curtail the domestic legal status of U.S. treaties in unanticipated ways.

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

Eric Lichtblau's Bush's Law: Has American Justice Been Remade, or Just Bungled?
NY Times reporter Eric Lichtblau has published an account of DOJ during the Bush years, Bush's Law: The Remaking of American Justice, which we can add to the growing shelf of books looking at the legal aspects of Bush Administration national security policy. It mostly hews to the formula: bad things done, people hurt, the Constitution trashed.

The book is a taut read; Lichtblau is a talented reporter. The material on the NSA surveillance regime is the centerpiece, a story Lichtblau broke with James Risen. But I don't think the material comes anywhere close to its "All the President's Men" aspirations (Jeff Rosen has a contrary take on that). DOJ looks more like a bunch of bumblers than serious heavies, and the law seems to have survived the test mostly intact. It's low theater rather than high. That's not to say that there haven't been many collateral casualties, but at least at home nothing like during the McCarthy era (most of us would have lost our jobs by now).

For more, see my review in the New York Observer here.
On Cancer and Global Suffering
If you will indulge a serious post about human suffering, I wanted to pass on Harvard Law Professor Bill Stuntz’s wonderful reflections on his struggle with cancer. I think it is appropriate for this blog because he reflects upon human suffering throughout the world, and emphasizes the irony that only those living in privileged, rich countries think they should be exempt from pain and suffering.


My cancer has been promoted: I’m officially in stage 4. My doctors have found two cancerous nodules—a euphemism for “small tumors”—one on each of my lungs. I started chemo this week….

I don’t have any previous experience with this sort of thing, but judging from what I hear and read, I’m supposed to be asking why all this is happening, and why it’s happening to me. Honestly, those questions are about the farthest thing from my mind.

Partly, that’s because they aren’t hard questions. Why does our world have gravity? Why does the sun rise in the East? There are technical answers, but the metaphysical answer is simple: that’s how reality works. So too here. Only in the richest parts of the rich world of the twenty-first century could anyone entertain the thought that we should expect long, pain-free lives. Suffering and premature death (an odd phrase: what does it mean to call death “premature”?) are constant presences in the lives of most of the peoples of the Earth, and were routine parts of life for generations of our predecessors in this country—as they still are today, for those with their eyes open. Stage 4 cancers happen to middle-aged men and women, seemingly out of the blue, because that’s how reality works.

As for why this is happening to me in particular, the implicit point of the question is an argument: I deserve better than this. There are two responses. First, I don’t—I have no greater moral claim to be free from unwanted pain and loss than anyone else. Plenty of people more virtuous than I am suffer worse than I have, and some who don’t seem virtuous at all skate through life with surprising ease. Welcome to the world. Once again, it seems to me that this claim arises from the incredibly unusual experience of a small class of wealthy professionals in the wealthiest parts of the world today. We think we live in a world governed by merit and moral desert. It isn’t so. Luck, fortune, fate, providence—call it what you will, but whatever your preferred label, it has far more to do with the successes of the successful than what any of us deserves. Aristocracies of the past awarded wealth and position based on the accident of birth. Today’s meritocracies award wealth and position based on the accident of being in the right place at the right time. The difference is smaller than we tend to think. Once you understand that, it’s hard to maintain a sense of grievance in the face of even the ugliest medical news. I’ve won more than my share of life’s lotteries. It would seem churlish to rail at the unfairness of losing this one—if indeed I do lose it: which I may not.

The second response is simpler; it comes from the movie “Unforgiven.” Gene Hackman is dying, and says to Clint Eastwood: “I don’t deserve this. To die like this. I was building a house.” Eastwood responds: “Deserve’s got nothing to do with it.”

That gets it right, I think. It’s a messed-up world, upside-down as often as it’s rightside up. Bad things happen; future plans (that house Hackman was building) come to naught. Deserve’s got nothing to do with it.

Put the ICTY Archives Online!
As this essay in the invaluable Institute for War and Peace Studies argues, a debate over the final location of the ICTY's documentary archives is missing the point.


The archive of the ICTY is a vast and invaluable collection, and its holdings will be indispensible for anyone researching or investigating events of the 1990s, in any former Yugoslav republic.

But most importantly, it is a digitised archive. Over the past 15 years, ICTY employees have scanned virtually every document and made many of them searchable, so that anyone with appropriate access to the tribunal’s computers can find references to a person, place, word, or topic among the millions of documents gathered by tribunal investigators.



For purely historical purposes, this stuff should be available. Because I suppose legal liability will continue to be an issue even after the ICTY closes shop, there needs to be some filtering. Still, it is tempting just to put it all online. It's already digitized. And it would unleash the bloggers of the world (who speak the relevant languages) on the process of building a more complete historical record of the Balkan wars and their aftermath.

Monday, April 7, 2008

What Do a Top-Shelf Vodka and Illegal Immigrants Have In Common?
They're both participants in the reconquista, illegal immigrants as the foot soldiers and now a vodka purveyor as its cartographer.

Entertaining little dust-up over this ad from Absolut, depicting (very roughly) Mexico along the lines of its early 19th century boundaries. The ad was targeted at Mexican consumers, "based upon historical perspectives and ... created with a Mexican sensibility," according to the company's blog.

Did the folks at Absolut really think someone in El Norte wouldn't get wind of it? The ad predictably played into "Aztlan" conspiracy theories. The company has apologized (perhaps it has gone down-market enough to fear boycotts by the Lou Dobbs crowd). The reconquista is laughable in so many ways, among them its premises a) that Mexicans in the US are doing the Mexico government's bidding, and b) that territory means much any more.
Ratner in FP on the Geneva Conventions
Steve Ratner has a nice turn at the "Think Again" column in the latest Foreign Policy (teaser here - let this be a good reason to subscribe). Steve takes on various elements of the popular conventional wisdom on the Geneva Conventions, including the line that they are obsolete:
The conventions won’t prevent wars—they were never intended to—but they can and do protect innocent bystanders, shield soldiers from unnecessary harm, limit the physical damage caused by war, and even enhance the chances for cease-fires and peace. The fundamental bedrock of the conventions is to prevent suffering in war, and that gives them a legitimacy for anyone touched by conflict, anywhere and at any time. That is hardly quaint or old-fashioned.
Not all from one side, though: the piece also notes that the GCs don't require Guantanamo's closure, and labels as "absurd" the assertion that the US flouts the regime more than any other nation.
Has Jack Goldsmith Gone Soft on International Law?
This among his useful suggestions as to how to fix the errors of Bush in anti-terror policy in a Slate column last week:
• Work with allies to establish an international legal framework for terrorists. Last week, John McCain called for a "new international understanding on the disposition of dangerous detainees under our control." This is a good idea, not because of a squishy commitment to internationalism but because an international consensus on how to treat detainees would foster deeper international cooperation crucial in thwarting terrorists.

To achieve this goal, the United States must stop talking about which international laws do not govern the detention of terrorists and start talking about which ones do. . . .
Okay, so Jack's still against squishiness. But here's the friendly challenge: how to reconcile a position that sees any value in international humanitarian regimes with the premise of his and Eric Posner's The Limits of International Law, which dismisses IL as a mostly marginal constraint on state action (see for instance pp. 85-88). The Limits is not very keen on multilateral agreements insofar as they are not subject to reliable sanctions by independent third parties. Has something changed, or is there some about the anti-terror context which makes them a meaningful vehicle for modifying state behavior?

Sunday, April 6, 2008

Playing Up the Fine Print: Ackerman and Hathaway on the War's "Expiration Date"
Bruce Ackerman and Oona Hathaway had this op-ed in Saturday's WaPo arguing that congressional authorization for the Iraq deployment will expire with official the UN mandate for the multinational force come January 1, 2009. The piece works from the limitation in Congress' 2002 joint resolution approving the use of force only to "(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." The first hardly works any more, note Ackerman and Hathaway, and the second won't as of next winter.

It's a nice catch, and the argument would hit home if we were dealing with anything other than the use of force. But what if the new year comes around with neither a new UNSC resolution or modification of congressional authorization? The answer: nothing! As with the War Powers Resolution (which purported in these terms to include a default "expiration date" on all presidential uses of force), you're not going to win a war's end on legalisms. The only thing that will do the trick is an affirmative qualification or withdrawal of congressional authorization going forward, something that proved impossible to secure even when the war still dominated the front page.