Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Friday, May 16, 2008

ATS Apartheid Case Affirmed by Supreme Court
In a strange move, the Supreme Court on Monday affirmed the ATS Apartheid case of Khulamani v. Barclay Bank (recaptioned at the Supreme Court as American Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza). The stated reason? The Court lacked a quorum. From the docket sheet:

Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U.S.C. § 1, and since a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment is affirmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances the Court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided Court. The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1, "the Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum." And under 28 U.S.C. § 2109, in any case "which cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified justices, if a majority of the qualified justices shall be of opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next ensuing term, the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court." Apparently four justices had to recuse themselves and therefore the Court lacked the six justice quorum required to decide the case.

If you look at the list of defendants it is perhaps not surprising that many of the justices had a conflict. Still, I have never heard of anything like this in such an important case. Lyle Denniston has more here.

Monday, May 5, 2008

ICTR "Disowns" Human Rights Watch
How desperate is the ICTR to fulfill its completion strategy by dumping cases on Rwanda? Enough to disavow the NGO on which it has relied on for nearly 14 years:
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) when presenting last week his motion in favour of transfer of genocide accused Yusuf Munyakazi to Rwanda, clearly distanced himself from the Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) Human Rights Watch (HRW), on which, however, the UN Court has relied on for the last 14 years for expert testimony.

Presenting his arguments before the Chamber, the prosecutor accused HRW of lack of credibility and having confused the collection of information on the violations of human rights in general and international criminal proceedings in an apparent attempt to rebuff HRW's contention not to send 1994 genocide accused persons to stand trials in Kigali.

He also affirmed that the HRW's sources were in fact "inadmissible and not very reliable".

Since the first indictment presented at the ICTR, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has relied mainly on the collective investigation carried out by HRW and the book titled "Leave None to Tell the Story", which it presents as evidence in the majority of the trials.

The prosecution, moreover, has called in almost every trial as an expert witness, Dr Allison des Forges, official in charge of Africa for HRW, who is also a historian and specialist in Rwanda.
By "lack of credibility," the prosecutor really means "not letting us get away with allowing ICTR defendants to receive unfair trials in Rwanda." Which they will, as I have argued and as HRW has documented in detail.

Not suprisingly, HRW rejected the prosecutor's allegations:
Responding to the Prosecution's allegations, Ms Reidy informed the Chamber of their systematic compilation of reports, method applied and categories of people interviewed in their investigations of the Rwandan judicial system.

For example, among people questioned, she affirmed, were four current or former ministers of justice, 14 current or former judges, 11 current or former prosecutors, three current or former bar association presidents, 15 national or international NGO representatives and more than 100 Rwandan victims of various abuses of the legal system.
I understand the Security Council's eagerness for the ICTR to close up shop. But that eagerness cannot be allowed to override the rights of ICTR defendants.

Friday, April 25, 2008

Map Art
Here is a sample of some of the wonderful map art of Susan Stockwell:

Fleece England...



Rubber Africa...



Coffee Filter South America...



Tea bag China...


Monday, March 17, 2008

South Africa's Conditional Universal Jurisdiction -- and Its Potential Effect on Zimbabwe
A human-rights NGO in South Africa, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), has formally requested the National Prosecuting Authority's Priority Crimes Unit to investigate senior Zimbabwean officials suspected of committing crimes against humanity:
Said SALC Director Nicole Fritz on Sunday: "The intention behind the initiative is both to ensure some form of accountability for the people of Zimbabwe at a time when their own justice system has all but collapsed and also to secure South Africa's interest against becoming a 'safe haven' for perpetrators of the most egregious international crimes."

South Africa's implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, No 27 of 2002, permits prosecutions for crimes against humanity of those who are not South African nationals or have not committed such crimes on SA's territory if such a person after the commission of the crime, is present in South Africa.

Several of the perpetrators named in the dossier travelled to South Africa on official business, in some instances for co-operative endeavours such as the South Africa/Zimbabwe Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security.

Moreover, given Zimbabwe's economic collapse, many of those named travelled to South Africa to obtain desired commodities and services, including healthcare, Fritz said.
Although it is obviously too early to predict whether SALC's request will go anywhere, the request foregrounds how important it is for states to adopt conditional universal jurisdiction for serious international crimes, particularly when they share a border with the state in which the crimes are being committed. The Zimbabwean officials will be far less likely to venture into South Africa if they fear facing prosecution there. And that threat exists only because South Africa has taken a very progressive approach to its incorporation of the Rome Statute.

Imagine if every peaceful state in Africa followed South Africa's lead and embraced conditional universal jurisdiction. With no safe havens to flee to, petty dictators like Mugabe and their minions would almost certainly think twice before committing their crimes.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Why the ICC Should Not Step Aside -- At Least Not Yet
Not surprisingly, I strongly disagree with Julian's insistence that "the ICC really is now the obstacle to peace" in Uganda.

To begin with, we need to give the ICC credit where credit is due: as Mark Leon Goldberg pointed out earlier today at the invaluable UN Dispatch, "[i]t was not until the ICC began its investigation and issued indictments that the LRA began to seek a peace agreement with the Ugandan government in good faith; the ICC indictments provided the critical leverage to get the peace process going." I think that statement is somewhat one-sided: the Ugandan government doesn't exactly have a sterling record when it comes to genuinely seeking peace with the LRA. (See here for a nice summary.) Nevertheless, Goldberg's basic point — that the peace negotiations never stood much of a chance of success prior to the ICC's involvement — seems undeniable.

That does not mean, of course, that the ICC has not overstayed its welcome. Perhaps Julian is right that the Court now needs to figure out a way "to back down gracefully." But let's be clear about one thing: if the ICC dismisses the arrest warrants, we will not see justice in Uganda any time soon. Just consider the bait-and-switch that the Ugandan government and the LRA have pulled in the last month alone. First the plan was to try Kony and the others for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Uganda's High Court:
“First of all, this protocol which has been signed is a very important protocol because it deals with important issues like handling impunity. And we hope that after that the remaining agendas are not so difficult. This is the ceasefire and then the DDR, this is demobilization and disarmament, and the reintegration. So the protocol that has been signed is very, very important. Accepting to be subjected to laws is a major achievement, and we hope that we shall be seeing a positive conclusion of the peace talks in the nearest future,” she said.

Nankabirwa said the new agreement paves the way for those accused of severe crimes would be tried in the High Court of Uganda while those accused of lesser crimes would face the northern Uganda traditional justice system know as Mato Oput.

“First of all the crimes differ. There are small crimes which will be handled by the traditional judicial system, and we shall come up with a layout of the traditional judicial system to handle reconciliation and accountability. But the other crimes, like the war crimes, are normally handled by the High Court. So what the teams have done is append their signatures on exactly that so that at the end of the day there are some in the LRA who will appear before the High Court because of their crimes,” Nankabirwa said.
That plan was a step in the right direction, although it was clear that Uganda could not satisfy the ICC's principle of complementarity without fundamentally revamping its criminal justice system. (For an analysis of the shortcomings of the Ugandan system, see here.) But now the plan seems to have changed again — Museveni made it quite clear today that not even Kony and the other LRA leaders will stand trial in a Ugandan court:
Museveni said Joseph Kony, the LRA leader, and his commanders will instead be brought before "traditional" Ugandan courts - which emphasise apologies and compensation rather than punishment - as part of a deal to end a 21-year civil war marked by the abduction of children as combatants, mass rape of women and the mutilation and murder of civilians.

Museveni said local trials were the wish of the victims and leaders in the areas hit by the conflict.

"What we have agreed with our people is that they should face traditional justice, which is more compensatory than a retributive system," he said on a visit to London. "That is what we have agreed at the request of the local community. They have been mainly tormenting people in one area and it is that community which asked us to use traditional justice."
It is, if course, tempting to reply to this bait-and-switch by saying "so what?" If ordinary Ugandans believe that peace through traditional justice is more important than punishing the LRA for its many crimes, isn't that their right?

Maybe so — but that assumes ordinary Ugandans actually support trading justice for peace. Museveni claims that they do, but the evidence seems to indicate otherwise. Not only do a majority of Acholi chiefs believe that it is impossible to adapt mapo oput for use on a national scale given the scope and scale of the civil war, a recent study by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found that most Ugandans oppose not prosecuting high-level perpetrators like Kony and the other LRA leaders:
[R]espondents across the three sub-regions described the need for different levels of transitional justice processes to address different levels of perpetrators and crimes. Local practices, they argued, were appropriate only for the cleansing and reintegration of low-level perpetrators. In discussing the use of local practices, a male victim of violence in Lango said, “We can forgive the rest but top officials involved in the war crimes should be taken to court.” Most Langi and Iteso respondents opposed the use of practices for major perpetrators, such as senior Government or LRA figures, whom they argued should be prosecuted through court structures, including the ICC. “Prosecution by the international court is applicable for high ranking war perpetrators like Museveni and Kony,” said an LDU member in Teso. Two parents of abducted children in Lango said, “Kony must be taken to the ICC….Museveni should also be tried by the ICC.” Some abductees and their relatives in Acholiland argued along these same lines, underlining their desire to distance abductees from the rebel commanders who forced them to commit atrocities and who therefore, they argued, should be prosecuted.
If that's true, it is difficult to argue that the ICC should simply step aside and leave the Ugandan government and the LRA to their own devices. There is obviously no guarantee that the two sides, once freed from ICC oversight, will negotiate a peace that is genuinely acceptable to ordinary Ugandans. Indeed, the evidence to date indicates otherwise. And, of course, the Court will suffer significant and potentially irreparable harm if it rewards the combined Uganda/LRA temper tantrum: as John Boonstra noted today (also at UN Dispatch), "[i]f the ICC is seen as capitulating to the demands of its host government — or worse, to those of an indicted war criminal — a dangerous precedent will be set for the court's work elsewhere."

What, then, is the right answer? It seems to me that the answer lies in the ICC's principle of complementarity. Given that ordinary Ugandans favor traditional justice for low-level perpetrators and criminal prosecution for high-level perpetrators, the Court should insist on two things: (1) that the Ugandan government and the LRA revert back to their original plan to try Kony and the other LRA leaders in Uganda's High Court; and (2) that the Ugandan government revamp its criminal justice system to satisfy the principle of complementarity. At that point — and only at that point — should the ICC step aside.

Which is, of course, precisely what the ICC is designed to do.

Saturday, February 23, 2008

ICC Refuses to Lift LRA Arrest Warrants
Further to Julian's post on Friday, the ICC has already made clear that it has no intention of lifting the warrants:
The office of the prosecutor of International Criminal Court Thursday insisted arrest warrants for Lord's Resistance Army, or LRA, rebels in Uganda remain in effect following news Kampala has agreed to set up national courts to handle LRA crimes.

"The office of the prosecutor is not a party to the peace process," the office said in a statement. "The arrest warrants against the LRA commanders were issued by the court and remain in effect."
The ICC's position is sound, given that Uganda's national courts cannot possibly satisfy the principle of complementarity. I will explain why in a post in the next couple of days.

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Bush's Indefensible Comments on Peacekeeping in Darfur
At a joint press conference with Paul Kagame yesterday, President Bush was asked whether he would be willing to send U.S. troops to Darfur to help stop the systematic violence that is being committed there. Here, in relevant part, was his response:
I would say it's like — as I explained to this fellow here — that one of the lessons of the genocide in Rwanda was to take some of the early warnings signs seriously.

Secondly, a clear lesson I learned in the museum was that outside forces that tend to divide people up inside their country are unbelievably counterproductive. In other words, people came from other countries — I guess you'd call them colonialists — and they pitted one group of people against another. And an early warning sign was — and it's hard to have seen it, I readily admit, but I'm talking earlier than 1994, and earlier than the '90s — was the fact that it become a habit to divide people based upon — you know, in this case, whether they were Tutsi or Hutu, which eventually led to exploitation.
Oy gevalt. Where to begin? I guess by giving President Bush his due: yes, Belgium's actions during the 1930s, when it governed Ruanda-Urundi (present-day Rwanda and Burundi) pursuant to a League of Nations Mandate, played an integral role in creating conditions in Rwanda that eventually facilitated the 1994 genocide. As Mark Drumbl explains in Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law:
Belgian colonial administrators took a liking to the Tutsi, whom they treated preferentially. This angered the majority Hutu. In 1933, the Belgian colonial administration passed a law requiring every Rwandan to carry an ethnic identity card. The lines between Tutsi and Hutu, which traditionally had been porous and informal, suddenly became permanent and legalized. The ethnic identity card requirement persisted after Rwandan independence in 1960. Tragically, the continued presence of this requirement accelerated the genocide, insofar as persons unable to produce a Hutu card simply were slaughtered.
In every other respect, however, President Bush's response makes absolutely no sense. There is no question that the colonial powers often created ethnic divisions where previously there were none. But that fact says nothing — literally nothing — about whether it is a good idea for "outside forces" to use their military power to prevent violence between ethnic groups that are already divided. Indeed, it is particularly ironic that the joint press conference was held in a museum dedicated to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a genocide that may well have been avoided, or at least reduced in ferocity, had "outside forces" intervened more forcefully. Drumbl again:
The bulk of the peacekeeping effort fell upon the shoulders of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). This was headed by a Canadian, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, and was constituted by soldiers from several countries. UNAMIR had been present in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide. It's size was reduced in early 1994 with the murder, by Hutu extremists, of a number of Belgian peacekeepers, which prompted the withdrawal of the remaining Belgians. UNAMIR, despite brave and dedicated efforts, was understaffed and crimped by extremely tight rules of engagement that prevented it from fighting back against the genocideal killers or intervening more directly.

Dallaire bluntly has stated that the international community lacked the will to intervene decisively in Rwanda. Although Dallaire communicated to senior UN officials the intelligence he had received from informants well ahead of time that genocide was being planned in Rwanda, institutionally speaking the United Nations remained unmoved. The execution of the actual genocide corresponded closely to what Dallaire had been told months in advance would take place. Dallaire's requests for more forces, better equipment, and a more aggressive mandate went unheeded.
Drumbl then adds what should be obvious to anyone familiar with the situation:
Tragically, over a decade later, dithering now is occurring with regard to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement intervention to mitigate atrocity in the Darfur region of the Sudan.
Let me be clear: the entire international community was responsible for not intervening more forcefully in Rwanda, and the entire international community seems bent on repeating its mistakes in Darfur. (See Peggy's post about helicopters here, for example.)

Nevertheless, statements like President Bush's — statements that call into question the very idea of peacekeeping — only make the situation worse. And they are particularly indefensible coming from a President whose administration is now more than $1 billion behind in its overall UN peacekeeping dues — and whose recent pledge of $100 million for peacekeeping in Darfur is $15 million less than what it already owed the UN for Darfur before the announcement of the joint UN-AU peacekeeping mission.

Saturday, February 9, 2008

Mapping the Evolution of States and Empires
The bloggers at Coming Anarchy have put together an informative series of posts about the shifting borders of states and empires. There’s a time-lapse animation of the expansion and contraction of Rome and Byzantium, a series of maps for each of Ethiopia, Poland, Armenia , Persia, and Russia. Also, there’s a series of comparative maps on state borders in modern Europe.

Along similar lines (and in light of current events), I would also recommend Catholicgauze's post on the ethnic geography of Kosovo.

Since a picture is worth a thousand words, I am in favor of the "geographic turn" in international law, in which we as lawyers become more sensitive to issues of space and place, and how our represenations of them affect the rules that we make. And vice versa. Reflecting on his travels through the Caucasus, Northern Iraq, and West Africa, journalist Robert Kaplan noted in his book The Coming Anarchy (from where the blog got its name) that he “develop[ed] a healthy skepticism toward maps, which, I began to realize, create a conceptual barrier that prevents us from comprehending the political crack-up just beginning to occur worldwide.”

For some examples of recent scholarship in law and geography, see, for example, the articles of Hari Osofsky and Tim Zick. Hari blogged about law and geography here. I also have a forthcoming piece in the Oregon Review of International Law on how geographic and cartographic concepts have affected our understanding of self-determination and secession. More on that in another post.

For now, check out the maps!

Hat tip: Catholicgauze

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Mapping the Future of the Middle East
  2. Mapping the Evolution of States and Empires

Friday, February 8, 2008

Another Congolese Warlord in ICC Custody -- and Sloppy Reporting by the ICC
The ICC has a third suspect in custody. Not surprisingly, he's another Congolese rebel:
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a Congolese national and alleged former leader of the National integrationist Front (FNI) and currently a Colonel in the National Army of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [Forces armées de la RDC/ Armed Forces of the DRC ] (FARDC), was arrested yesterday by the Congolese authorities and transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). He will be arriving today to the Detention Centre of the Court, in The Hague. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui is alleged to have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes as set out in articles 7 and 8 of the Statute, committed in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo since July 2002.
Ngudjolo is charged with three counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, sexual slavery, and inhumane acts (the dreaded catch-all provision); and six counts of war crimes, including wilful killing, using child soldiers, sexual slavery, attacking civilian populations, and pillaging. Here is the ICC's summary of the factual allegations underlying the charges:
The Pre-Trial Chamber I found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, as the highest ranking FNI commander, played an essential role in designing and implementing an indiscriminate attack against the village of Bogoro, in the territory of Ituri, on or around 24 February 2003.

The Chamber also found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that during and after the attack on the village of Bogoro against civilians, primarily of Hema ethnicity, with the active participation of children under the age of fifteen years, several criminal acts were committed: the murder of about 200 civilians; causing serious bodily harm to civilians; arresting, threatening with weapons and imprisoning civilians in a room filled with corpses; pillaging; sexual enslavement of several women and girls.

The Chamber further found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a common plan to carry out an attack on Bogoro was agreed upon by Ngudjolo Chui and other senior FNI and FRPI (Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri/ Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri) military commanders, and that the criminal acts committed during and after the attack were part of the common plan or, were, at the very least, a probable and accepted consequence of the implementation of the said common plan.

Again, according to the Chamber, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the attack on the village of Bogoro took place in the context of an armed conflict in the territory of Ituri, and that the attack was jointly launched by the FNI and the FRPI as part of a systematic or widespread attack directed against the civilian population of certain parts of the territory of Ituri, primarily of Hema ethnicity, between January and at least March 2003.
Ngudjolo's arrest continues the Prosecutor's single-minded focus on Congolese rebels — all three of the suspects currently in custody (the others are Germain Katanga and Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) were rebel warlords. As I have noted before, that focus is difficult to understand, given that government forces are no less responsible for the atrocities committed in the DRC. Indeed, I can't help but wonder whether unease with the free pass the Prosecutor has given the Congolese government to date explains why the ICC Press Release describes Ngudjolo as "currently a Colonel in the National Army of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," making it seem like the Prosecutor is finally going after a government soldier. That description, unfortunately, is misleading at best. Ngudjolo was not a colonel in the National Army when he allegedly committed the atrocities, nor was he a colonel when he was arrested. Instead, he was training to become a colonel in the National Army as part of a peace deal with the Congolese government:
Just days ago it was a different story for Ngudjolo, a former nurse from Bunia whom ICC prosecutors accuse of six counts of war crimes and three of crimes against humanity in connection with an attack on a village in Ituri. He and two other top rebel leaders from Ituri were in the capital to undergo military training after agreeing to demobilise as paramilitaries and accept jobs as colonels in the regular army.

All three have been accused of war crimes, and the idea that they should simply be incorporated into the DRC military with apparent impunity was controversial both in the country and abroad.

Human rights activists applauded Ngudjolo’s arrest, saying it sent an important signal to those in Congo who consider themselves untouchable.

"We have condemned this cycle of impunity in the DRC whereby warlords - instead of being prosecuted for the crimes they committed against civilians - are being promoted. It has been a common practice in Congo to reward war criminals with positions in the army," said Geraldine Mattioli from Human Rights Watch.

"It sends the wrong signal to warlords – that committing crimes is a good way to get to the top of the army."
HRW is certainly correct that Ngujdolo's arrest may help deter the Congolese government from using army positions as bargaining chips with criminally-minded warlords. And that is a good thing. But unless his arrest somehow disrupts the peace process, it's difficult to overlook the fact that this was essentially costless PR for the Congolese government: they not only purged a recruit who was causing international controversy, they appeared — thanks to sloppy reporting by the ICC — to be so committed to cooperating with the ICC that they would even turn over one of their own.

Nothing, of course, is further from the truth. And I imagine the ICC knows it.

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

The Other Half of the Picture
Like Roger, and the rest of the Opinio Juris bloggers, I want to thank Walter Russell Mead for joining us this week. I found God and Gold to be provocative and to contain wonderful insights, particularly concerning why the Anglo-Saxon powers have done remarkably well in conflicts over the last 300 years.

But my first comment in this discussion will be less about what Mead did analyze in the opening two sections of the book (discussing the “clash of civilizations” and what may be called the Anglo-Saxon diplomatic and warfighting methods), then about what he did not cover. By this, I mean that Mead has built a fascinating but largely Eurocentric (if I could include the U.S.) narrative. I question this not out of some misguided “political correctness” but rather because I think that to understand properly the Anglo-Saxon encounter with the rest of the world, and particularly to understand why some people push back, it is vital to give due weight to the beliefs, goals, and concerns of those people. Otherwise, one gets only half the picture; and a picture which is somewhat rose-tinted, to boot.

Mead describes what he calls (tongue-in-cheek, I think) “Waspophobia” and concludes, “[w]hatever we call it, the hatred and fear of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants and of all their doings is one of the motors driving the world.” (p.58, my emphasis.) A history which gave serious weight to the actual desires and fears of those in the periphery of this story (that is, the rest of the world besides Western Europe and North America) may find that, perhaps, hatred of the powerful WASPs is not as important an engine as it may seem. Maybe, instead, the people of the periphery were not just reacting against Britain or the U.S. but were acting upon their own affirmative visions of what they wanted to build. If that is the case, then understanding those plans and goals generated in the periphery--and why the U.K. and the U.S. chose to react against them, is a key part of the story of how Britain and America "made" the modern world.

If one focused equally on the encounter as it was experienced in the countries facing Anglo-Saxon power, then one would not consider the issue of “How They Hate Us” (the title of Chapter 3) without even mentioning Mossadegh or Allende. Or the U.S. backing of the Shah, Pinochet, and Duvalier, to give a few examples. It would also be less likely that post-World War II history would receive a gloss such as “America supported independence drives in the former colonies, and then allowed new states to enter the global economic system the U.S. was building.” (p. 112) To quote a Haitian folk saying: “He who is hit always remembers. He who hits always forgets.” I think the narrative in the opening sections of God and Gold has forgotten the other half of the picture.

It is by forgetting—or by only briefly considering—the various examples of bad faith or bad acts by the great powers that we come to oversimplify the interaction the U.K, the U.S., and the rest of the world. Mead summarizes:
Rich and free but also cold and inhuman: this is how the West looks from the East…

It is what Occidentalists look at when they hate and fear the West; it is what Waspophobes are talking about when they decry the global power and influence of Britain and the United States today.
(p. 175)
No, they are probbly talking about more than that. And this is missed in Mead’s analysis because the opening two sections of God and Gold present an essentially a metropolitan history of international politics. As Mead puts it:
To the degree that the story of world power politics in the last few centuries has a single overarching plot, that plot is the long and continuing rise of the maritime system as its center shifted from the United Provinces to the United Kingdom to the United States. (p.173)
I agree with that, as a general matter and, as I stated in the opening, I think Mead has much of great insight to say on the geopolitical style of the U.K and the U.S. But this story only goes so far; it is one in which great powers were trying to outmaneuver each other on the chessboard that is the rest of the world. The board, and the chessmen on it, are barely described. And, at least the way the first two sections of this book read, the board and the gamepieces are acted upon, they are not actors in this story.

Giving serious attention not just to the power politics and economic and social proclivities of the U.K. and the U.S., but also to those of states on the periphery, can lead to further insights as to the role of Anglo-Saxon power in the world, besides those that Mead has presented.

Saturday, January 26, 2008

ICTR Roundup
I've fallen behind in my Rwanda blogging. Here are some of the recent highlights — or lowlights, depending on your perspective:
  • The ICTR announced that it will miss its 2008 deadline for completing its trial phase. According to the Tribunal's spokesman, at least one trial will not be finished by the end of the year. The ICTR intends to refer the case to Rwanda.

  • The ICTR publicly praised Rwanda's gacaca courts: "Gacaca courts have done a lot of tremendous work. They have helped in bringing justice and reconciliation in Rwanda because they are based on Rwandan tradition." Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth. As I discuss in my recent review essay of Mark Drumbl's excellent Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, gacaca courts are unfair, have lost whatever social legitimacy they might have initially possessed, and bear no resemblance to traditional Rwandan dispute-resolution mechanisms.

  • In related news, Rwanda intends to continue to use gacaca courts in 2008, despite the fact that their legal mandate ended on December 31, 2007. Even worse, Rwanda wants the gacaca courts to begin trying Category 1 cases, those involving the planning or organizing of killings. Such serious crimes were formerly the province of Rwanda's ordinary criminal courts — themselves troubled, but certainly more fair than the gacaca courts.

  • Rwanda is angry with the ICTR for referring Wenceslas Munyeshyaka and Laurent Bucyibaruta to France for prosecution. Rwanda wants the two men extradited instead. The ICTR's decision should come as little surprise, however, given that a Rwandan military tribunal has already sentenced Munyeshyaka in absentia to life imprisonment.

  • Rwanda is also angry at a French appellate court for refusing to extradite, on procedural grounds, Dominique Ntawukuriryayo to the ICTR. A lower court had previously approved the extradition. Ntawukuriryayo's case will now return to the lower court for reconsideration.

  • In an important legal first, the ICTR sentenced a prosecution witness to nine months imprisonment for committing perjury during the trial of Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, who is serving two life sentences for his role in the 1994 genocide. No word as to whether the conviction will affect Kamuhanda's sentences, which were upheld by the Appeals Chamber in 1995.

  • An ICTR investigator working as part of Father Emmanuel Rukundo's defense team has been detained by the Rwandan government for the past six months for allegedly bribing witnesses and "trivializing" the 1994 genocide. Although such detention is clearly inconsistent with Article 29 of the ICTR Statute's immunity provisions, the ICTR has ignored repeated defense requests to intervene on the investigator's behalf.

  • The human-rights NGO African Rights has alleged that an ICTR employee who works in the documentation center was himself involved in the 1994 genocide. African Rights has also accused the employee of intimidating witnesses into refusing to testify against Father Hormisdas Nsengimana, currently on trial at the ICTR.
All kinds of interesting developments! More soon.

Monday, January 21, 2008

The Impact of Martin Luther King on International Law
Martin Luther King did not intend to impact international law, but he did so nonetheless. His life-long struggle was to secure racial equality in the United States. His non-violent efforts rarely focused on the worldwide struggle against racial injustice.

But on a few occasions he elaborated on the relationship between the civil rights movement and the global struggle for colonial independence. In his Nobel Lecture, for example, he emphasized the connection between the American struggle and the rest of the world. “In one sense the civil rights movement in the United States is a special American phenomenon which must be understood in the light of American history and dealt with in terms of the American situation. But on another and more important level, what is happening in the United States today is a relatively small part of a world development…. What we are seeing now is a freedom explosion…. All over the world, like a fever, the freedom movement is spreading in the widest liberation in history. The great masses of people are determined to end the exploitation of their races and land.”

While King did not make overt efforts to promote racial equality through international law, he was a source of inspiration for those who did. King and another black Nobel Peace Laureate, the South African Zulu Chief Albert Lutuli, embodied and symbolized different parts of the global movement for racial equality. The struggle against colonialism, apartheid, and racial injustice were all intertwined as part of a groundswell of support for racial freedom. This movement manifested itself in international law.

By 1964, the United Nations had grown to 115 members, well over double the membership with which it began in 1945. Almost seventy-five percent of these countries were in the developing world, and the debates at the UN were transformed by this new controlling majority of delegates. The UN delegates from developing countries were united in their efforts to combat racial injustice. They were greatly influenced by Martin Luther King’s struggle against racial discrimination within the United States, and particularly galvanized by the racial persecution in South Africa. As discussed in this book by Paul Gordon Lauren, “[w]ith all these violations of racial equality, the new majority of Asian and African delegates decided that it was time for them to do whatever they possibly could to help transform this particular feature of the Universal Declaration into reality.”

The immediate result was the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The Convention was the first major international human rights treaty adopted since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As U.N. Secretary General U Thant put it, “the world has anxiously awaited the completion of other parts of … an International Bill of Human Rights” and this convention represents “a most significant step towards the realization of one of the [United Nations’] long-term goals.”

The civil rights movement also directly affected the United States’ political support for the CERD. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg explicitly linked support for the treaty with the domestic struggle for racial equality. In July 1966, he described the treaty as according “completely with the policy of my government and the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of our citizens.” He said that the United States “has not always measured up to its constitutional heritage of equality … but we have made much progress in the past few years, and while not all our ills have been cured, we are on the march.”

The success of CERD broke the stalemate that had prevented completion of the work on the other major human rights covenants. As Natan Lerner noted in this book, passage of CERD “proved that if the political will existed among the majority, the United Nations could move forward in extending rights and setting standards.” By easily securing passage of a treaty prohibiting racial discrimination, the UN delegates generated momentum the following year for adoption of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR), the two most important human rights treaties since the Universal Declaration.

Never before in history had so many major human rights treaties been created in such a short time. The struggle against colonialism, apartheid, and racial inequality coalesced in the mid-1960s with the conclusion of groundbreaking international human rights treaties. As a result, international law would never be the same.

Saturday, January 12, 2008

The Spiritual Capital of Successful Countries
Paul Marshall has an interesting op-ed in the Washington Post on the spiritual capital of successful countries. I know Marshall well and his analysis seems exactly right to me.

In the piece he discusses a fascinating World Values Survey, which includes a cultural map of the world, pictured at left (click to enlarge). That map divides the world according to two major dimensions: the Traditional/Secular-rational dimension and the Survival/Self-Expression dimension.

Although Marshall doesn't mention international law, I think it follows from his discussion that scholars should be much more open to the study of the impact of religion on international law and international relations. Here is an excerpt:


Religion does not exist in isolation. It concerns and shapes our fundamental view of the nature of human life and how it is and should be lived. This realization has come home in politics, especially international politics. Obviously, when we are under attack by people whose ideology we cannot understand unless we delve into the history of Islamic law and theology, we must learn to take their religious doctrines seriously.

The future is likely to bring many more debates on how religion shapes not only politics but economics.... Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary of Harvard University have used the results of World Values Surveys to study the relation between religion and economic attitudes. They found that many religious beliefs concerning cooperation, government, working women, legal rules, thriftiness and the market economy are conducive to higher per-capita income and growth. Religion appears to have an effect on economic growth and development by fostering thrift, a work ethic, honesty and openness to strangers. This has lead to the notion of "spiritual capital," analogous to human capital, which focuses on knowledge and behavior stemming from transcendent concepts and ultimate concerns.

Their model stresses the importance of freedom, not only in economics per se, but in religion itself. Religion most often has positive effects when it is free. This model is reinforced by the results of our recently concluded survey of international religious freedom. The countries with the worst religious freedom records, including Burma, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have, unless they have oil, terrible economic records. Similar relations hold for those in the middle and for those with high levels of freedom: The highest 30 countries in rankings of economic freedom all scored highly on religious freedom.

Barro and McCleary's work suggests that this is more than a mere correlation: There is good reason to think that religious freedom leads to good economic outcomes. The current evidence indicates that closed religious systems hamper economic development. Hence, if we want economic growth and development, we need to permit religious groups and people to follow their beliefs. In this case, economists should join political scientists in examining religion more seriously.

Whether we like it or not, religion is likely to remain central to politics, and even economics. This means that in the future, politicians, Democrats as well as Republicans, are likely to expand their talk of religion on the campaign trail. We should not dismiss this as if religion were a mere irrational prejudice or interest-group totem. We should instead demand that politicians address these fundamental issues in a serious, coherent and empirically grounded way. If they do not do so, they (and we) will misunderstand our all-too-religious world.

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Liberia's TRC Begins Work
The beginning of Charles Taylor's trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone is obviously big news, and those who are interested in the trial should check out the live-blogging and analysis here. But Taylor's trial should not overshadow an equally important event related to the civil war in Liberia — the launch of Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
The commission was established along similar lines to South Africa's post-apartheid body.

Since 2003, Liberia has inched forward, helped by the presence of thousands of peacekeeping troops.

The conflict saw the rise and fall of Charles Taylor, who is now on trial for war crimes in The Hague.

[snip]

Opening proceedings, Mrs Johnson-Sirleaf called on Liberians to be honest and truthful to "help the process of healing".

"We call upon all officials of government; all Liberians, the president included, to respond to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission when called to do so, thereby obviating the need for the TRC to use its subpoena powers," she said.

The seven-member commission does not have the power to try cases but will investigate crimes; and victims, witnesses and alleged perpetrators will tell their version of events at the hearings.

In recent months the commission has taken statements from people around the country - some of them extremely gruesome testimonies of how lives were shattered as men, women and children with guns and crude weapons targeted civilians.

The first of three witnesses that appeared at the opening hearing described how his sister had died in 1995 after being raped by a group of 25 rebel fighters.

A Baptist minister then alleged that rebel forces had destroyed his church when they entered the capital, Monrovia, in 2003, and used other church buildings to store their arms.

The last witness accused rebels in 1990 of killing his father, a Supreme Court judge.
How effective Liberia's TRC will be remains to be seen. The BBC notes that Liberians disagree about whether it's a good idea, some believing that memories of the civil war are still too fresh, while others — including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the President of Liberia — believe that the truth behind the civil war needs to be definitively established.

I'm generally skeptical of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, particularly when they are intended to bring about social reconciliation. The South African TRC, for example, may have played a critical role in ensuring the country's political stability, but it did little to improve race relations. Indeed, a national poll conducted in 1998 found that nearly 2/3 of South Africans believed that the TRC simply made people angrier and caused relations between the races to actually deteriorate. (Readers who are interested in the problems with South Africa's TRC should make sure to read Richard Wilson's 2001 book The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa.)

I sincerely hope Liberia's TRC does better.

Tuesday, January 1, 2008

Divesting Federal Foreign Affairs Power? The Sudan Accountability & Divestment Act
It’s a happy new year (of sorts) for U.S. Human Rights Groups concerned about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur. For the last several years, groups such as the Save Darfur Coalition have pushed state and local governments to divest from companies that invest or do business with Sudan. Their efforts have produced some impressive results --since 2005, 22 U.S. states have divested their assets from Sudan, either along the lines recommended by the grassroots Sudan Divestment Task Force, or through some other model (the movement also has a private sector component, most visible through the 50-plus universities that have agreed to divest, and a transnational aspect, promoting similar divestment campaigns in countries such as Australia, Canada, Italy, Germany and the U.K.). Since its inception, however, the U.S. effort has operated under a constitutional cloud generated by the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in the Crosby case. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the Court held, without dissent, that a Massachusetts law banning state entities from buying goods or services from companies that did business with Burma was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause since it was preempted by the federal government’s foreign affairs power. Thus, Darfur activists had to worry about whether their divestment models differed enough from the Burma case, or if they would ultimately be struck down under a similar preemption analysis.

As of 2008, however, concerns about the divestment movements’ constitutionality appear greatly diminished. On New Year's Eve, President Bush signed into law the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA). Section 3 of the Act (available on Thomas as S.2271) contains the key provisions:


(b) Authority to Divest. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (e) to divest the assets of the State or local government from, or prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local government in, persons that the State or local government
determines, using credible information available to the public, are conducting or have direct investments in business operations described in subsection (d).

(c) Notice to Department of Justice. Not later than 30 days after adopting a measure pursuant to subsection (b), a State or local government shall submit written notice to the Attorney General describing the measure.

(d) Business Operations Described.
(1) In general. Business operations described in this subsection are business operations in Sudan that include power production activities, mineral extraction activities, oil-related activities, or the production of military equipment.

(2) Exceptions. Business operations described in this subsection do not include business operations that the person conducting the business operations can demonstrate--
(A) are conducted under contract directly and exclusively with the regional government of southern Sudan;
(B) are conducted under a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control, or are expressly exempted under Federal law from the requirement to be conducted under such a license;
(C) consist of providing goods or services to marginalized populations of Sudan;
(D) consist of providing goods or services to an internationally recognized peacekeeping force or humanitarian organization;
(E) consist of providing goods or services that are used only to promote health or education; or
(F) have been voluntarily suspended.

(e) Requirements. Any measure taken by a State or local government under subsection (b) shall meet the following requirements:
(1) Notice. The State or local government shall provide written notice and an opportunity to comment in writing to each person to whom a measure is to be applied;
(2) Timing. The measure shall apply to a person not earlier than the date that is 90 days after the date on which written notice is provided to the person under paragraph (1).
(3) Applicability. The measure shall not apply to a person that demonstrates to the State or local government that the person does not conduct or have direct investments in business operations described in subsection (d).

(SADA also restricts federal government contracting with companies doing business in Sudan through a new certification by contractors that they do not engage in any prohibited business with Sudan as defined under section 3(c) above.)

I was a bit surprised that the Bush Administration, which is not known for bowing to popular pressures when it comes to executive power, would go along with a bill that effectively empowers states and local governments to impact U.S. foreign relations. Indeed, if a campaign like this can work for Darfur, why not climate change? But, President Bush did not sign the bill without comment. Indeed, his signing statement, while acknowledging the problem of Darfur, suggests a view of executive foreign affairs power that will continue to override anything to the contrary, even in this Act of Congress:

I share the deep concern of the Congress over the continued violence in Darfur perpetrated by the Government of Sudan and rebel groups. My Administration will continue its efforts to bring about significant improvements in the conditions in Sudan through sanctions against the Government of Sudan and high level diplomatic engagement and by supporting the deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur.

This Act purports to authorize State and local governments to divest from companies doing business in named sectors in Sudan and thus risks being interpreted as insulating from Federal oversight State and local divestment actions that could interfere with implementation of national foreign policy. However, as the Constitution vests the exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations with the Federal Government, the executive branch shall construe and enforce this legislation in a manner that does not conflict with that authority.


Certainly these types of signing statements are nothing new for the Bush Administration. Here, it suggests an Administration that wants to have it both ways—get the political credit for doing something “new” on Sudan where other policies have been less than fully effective, while also preserving a plenary view of executive power as much as possible. Of course, none of this gets at the really important question, which is whether any of these activities—whether sanctions or divestment—will make a difference on the ground in Darfur. Let’s hope they do.

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Is the ICC Prosecutor Ignoring Sexual Violence in the DRC?
As I have noted before, human-rights groups have consistently and justifiably criticized the ICTR for failing to take seriously the systematic sexual violence committed against women during the 1994 genocide. Similar criticisms are now being leveled at the ICC regarding its investigation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
Congolese activists have launched an appeal at the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute those in their country who use rape as a weapon of war.

"Why does the ICC judge (militia chief) Thomas Lubanga for enrolment of child soldiers, but not for committing sexual crimes?" said Chouchou Namegabe, who represents 50 human rights groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

"This comes as a real shock for Congolese women," she said from the court's home in The Hague on the occasion of Human Rights Day on Monday.

[snip]

Congolese NGOs accuse all sides of using "systematic rape" against women aged from three months to 90 as a war tactic to intimidate the enemy, and are demanding the ICC enlarge its investigations to include sexual violence.

Namegabe told the story of a woman living near Bukavu who was raped by seven Hutu militiamen in front of her five children and her husband.

They then killed her husband and forced her eldest son to rape her, before forcing her to eat the flesh of her dead children and using her as a sex slave.

"The women do not dare to go into the fields any more for fear of being raped, and those who are raped are thrown out by their husbands, and they cannot tend to the needs of their families any more," added Kamuntu.

"The consequences are terrible: rural exodus, poverty and an increase in sexually transmitted diseases," she warned. "The trivialisation of rape is terrifying, as women represent 70 per cent of the victims of conflict in the DR Congo," International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) President Souhayr Belhassen said in Paris.
To be sure, the Prosecutor is investigating the situation in the Central African Republic, where sexual crimes against women significantly outnumber killings. Moreover, he has charged Germain Katanga with, inter alia, the war crime of sexual slavery.

That said, there is no question that sexual violence against women has reached epidemic proportions in the DRC. Human Rights Watch:
During five years of armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, or Congo), tens of thousands of women and girls1 were raped or otherwise subjected to sexual violence. Victims whose cases Human Rights Watch documented were as young as three years old. In a number of cases men and boys were also raped or sexually assaulted. The World Health Organization investigated the incidence of rape in the two provinces of South Kivu and Maniema and in the two cities of Goma (North Kivu province) and Kalémie (Katanga province) and concluded that some forty thousand persons had been raped.

Combatants of most armies and armed groups in eastern Congo committed acts of sexual violence both before and after the establishment of the transitional government. Alleged perpetrators include fighters of the former rebel movements, the RCD-Goma, the MLC, and RCD-ML, and soldiers of the former national army, the FAC, now all supposedly part of an integrated Congolese army. Perpetrators also include combatants of local armed groups, Mai Mai (groups resisting outside control), Burundian and Rwandan Hutu armed groups, and the ethnically-based UPC and FNI based in Ituri. Civilian and military judicial authorities and leaders of armed groups rarely punished perpetrators of these crimes. On occasion military commanders and the heads of armed groups seem to have encouraged the use of sexual violence as a way to terrorize civilians.
Given these statistics, it is more than a little unsettling that the ICC's first trial will focus exclusively on the recruitment of child soldiers. After all, there is substantial evidence that Lubanga himself is responsible for crimes of sexual violence (and other serious crimes, such as murder) — evidence that has been brought to the Prosecutor's attention, obviously with no effect. Here is part of a letter FIDH sent to him in July:
According to estimates by the United Nations, in the past six years more than 60,000 people have been slaughtered in Ituri alone. This reality requires that those responsible for the most serious crimes are brought to justice. As you are aware, the UPC, which Mr. Lubanga led, has committed numerous other serious crimes in Ituri including murder, torture and sexual violence. For example, in February-March 2003, UPC militias carried out a large-scale military operation called “Chikana Namukono” against the villages located between Lipri and Nyangaraye. The operation, a veritable manhunt, resulted in the killing of at least 350 persons and the complete destruction of 26 localities.

We are disappointed that nearly two years of investigation by your office in the DRC has not yielded a broader range of charges against Mr. Lubanga. Charging those responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Ituri - including, but not limited to Mr. Lubanga - with representative crimes for which there is a strong evidentiary basis is crucial for the victims of these crimes and for ending the culture of impunity in the DRC and in the Great Lakes region. We believe that the failure to include additional charges in the case against Mr. Lubanga could undercut the credibility of the ICC in the DRC.
The fact that Katanga is charged with more serious crimes, including sexual slavery and murder, compensates somewhat for the inadequate charges against Lubanga. But there is still the issue — which I have discussed before — that the Prosecutor has expressed little interest in prosecuting government soldiers for their crimes. Such selective prosecution is particularly troubling given that, as noted above, sexual violence against women is committed by government soldiers no less often, and no less systematically, than by the rebels.

One hopes that the Prosecutor will listen to the Congolese NGOs. As FIDH notes, the credibility of his investigation may well hang in the balance.

Saturday, December 8, 2007

The Hunger for Books
Doris Lessing received the Nobel Prize in Literature yesterday. Her Nobel Lecture is a joy to read.

It's so easy to take for granted how much books enrich our lives. Lessing helps us imagine a world without them, a world that is a reality for many in Africa today. Here is a taste:


Not long ago I was telephoned by a friend who said she had been in Zimbabwe, in a village where they had not eaten for three days, but they were talking about books and how to get them, about education….

It is said that a people gets the government it deserves, but I do not think it is true of Zimbabwe. And we must remember that this respect and hunger for books comes, not from Mugabe's regime, but from the one before it, the whites. It is an astonishing phenomenon, this hunger for books, and it can be seen everywhere from Kenya down to the Cape of Good Hope….

We are seeing here that great hunger for education in Africa, anywhere in the Third World, or whatever we call parts of the world where parents long to get an education for their children which will take them from poverty, to the advantage of an education….

I would like you to imagine yourselves, somewhere in Southern Africa, standing in an Indian store, in a poor area, in a time of bad drought. There is a line of people, mostly women, with every kind of container for water. This store gets a bowser of water every afternoon from the town and the people are waiting for this precious water. The Indian is standing with the heels of his hands pressed down on the counter, and he is watching a black woman, who is bending over a wadge of paper that looks as if it has been torn out of a book. She is reading Anna Karenin…. This man is curious. He says to the young woman. "What are you reading?" "It is about Russia," says the girl. "Do you know where Russia is?" He hardly knows himself. The young woman looks straight at him, full of dignity though her eyes are red from dust, "I was best in the class. My teacher said, I was best." The young woman resumes her reading: she wants to get to the end of the paragraph….

We are a jaded lot, we in our world – our threatened world. We are good for irony and even cynicism. Some words and ideas we hardly use, so worn out have they become. But we may want to restore some words that have lost their potency. We have a treasure-house – a treasure – of literature, going back to the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans. It is all there, this wealth of literature, to be discovered again and again by whoever is lucky enough to come on it. A treasure. Suppose it did not exist. How impoverished, how empty we would be….

That poor girl trudging through the dust, dreaming of an education for her children, do we think that we are better than she is – we, stuffed full of food, our cupboards full of clothes, stifling in our superfluities?

I think it is that girl and the women who were talking about books and an education when they had not eaten for three days, that may yet define us.

Thursday, November 29, 2007

Khulumani Cert. Petition Pending
SCOTUSblog has the details on the pending cert. petition to be filed by corporate defendants in the South African apartheid case of Khulumani v. Barclay Bank. It is worth a read.

Monday, November 26, 2007

Theorizing Bono
Today's WaPo has this lengthy feature on Bono and his humanitarian politicking. It's a Style section piece, tending to puffery. But there's some interesting information here which (even for those of us who mostly missed him as a musician) makes clear that he has to be taken seriously. Like the fact that he has 75 full-time staffers in his DC lobbying office.

So how to plug Bono into IR/IL paradigms? As Martha Finnemore and Kathyrn Sikkink describe in this article, "transnational norm entrepreneurs" are
extremely rational and, indeed, very sophisticated in their means-ends calculations about how to achieve their goals. They engage in something we would call "strategic social construction:" these actors are making detailed means-ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players' utility functions in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.
Bono seems to fit the bill. Unlike NGOs, he doesn't seem to use shaming as a tool, nor does he seem deploy voting constituencies or campaign contributions. (As a non-citizen, non-permanent resident, Bono isn't even allowed to give money to federal candidates.) Perhaps it's a moral authority, like the Pope (though the Pope of course does have a clear political constituency). Is it that the average unglamourous legislator craves the attention of a rock star, and changes her "utility functions" accordingly? Something like the cocktail party theory of Justice Kennedy. In any case, the Bono phenomenon would seem to give the lie to insulated, two-level models of political process.

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

United Kingdom, Ltd.
Which nation has the top brand name? It seems strange to think of the branding of nations, but upon reflection we do it all the time. When we think of a country like Australia, Iran, Switzerland or Sudan we associate certain positive or negative qualities to each nation.

A recent study reveals that the nations with the top brand names are the following (with apologies to Kevin): (1) United Kingdom; (2) Germany; (3) France; (4) Canada; (5) Switzerland; (6) Sweden; (7) Italy; (8) Australia; (9) Japan; and (10) the United States.

You can download the full report here. The report argues "globalization means that countries compete with each other for the attention, respect and trust of potential cunsumers, investors, tourists, immigrants, the media and governments of other nations." The brand of a country depends on tourism, exports, governance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, people, and tourism. The rankings don't surprise me at all, although I would not rank them in exactly that order.

Incidentally, the same is true of cities. Cities have brand names too, although the top ranked city in the world will probably surprise you. (The answer is below). According to the report, the United States is unusually blessed with cities that have great brand names. Based on a ranking of sixty cities globally, we have four global "megabrand" cities: New York, Washington D.C., Los Angeles, and San Francisco. We also have five second-tier cities: Boston, Las Vegas, Seattle, Chicago, and Atlanta. (The third-tier cities in the rankings were Philadelphia, Dallas, and New Orleans).

For example, my city of Los Angeles (they don't rank Malibu) does extremely well in numerous categories. It has a "sun and city" ranking of four, a business ranking of four, a social integration (would I fit in?) ranking of five, a "pulse" (is the city exciting?) ranking of nine, and an overall ranking of fifteen.

Finally, the same organization has a state branding index. Can you guess the top five brand names for U.S. states? (Hint: New Jersey doesn't make the cut).